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A Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games

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  • Salvador Barberà
  • Anke Gerber

Abstract

In this note we show that no solution to coalition formation games can satisfy a set of axioms that we propose as reasonable. Our result points out that “solutions” to the coalition formation cannot be interpreted as predictions of what would be “resting points” for a game in the way stable coalition structures are usually interpreted.

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Paper provided by Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich in its series IEW - Working Papers with number 238.

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Handle: RePEc:zur:iewwpx:238

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Keywords: Hedonic game; coalition formation; stability;

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References

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  1. Effrosyni Diamantoudi & Licun Xue, 2003. "Farsighted stability in hedonic games," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 39-61, 08.
  2. Bogomolnaia, Anna & Jackson, Matthew O., 2002. "The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 201-230, February.
  3. Tayfun Sönmez & Suryapratim Banerjee & Hideo Konishi, 2001. "Core in a simple coalition formation game," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 135-153.
  4. Barbera, Salvador & Gerber, Anke, 2003. "Corrigendum to "On coalition formation: durable coalition structures": [Mathematical Social Sciences 45 (2003) 185-203]," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 355-356, December.
  5. Licun Xue, 1998. "Coalitional stability under perfect foresight," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 603-627.
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Cited by:
  1. Eric Weese, 2011. "Political Mergers as Coalition Formation," Working Papers 997, Economic Growth Center, Yale University.
  2. Fehr, Ernst & Fischbacher, Urs & Kosfeld, Michael, 2005. "Neuroeconomic Foundation of Trust and Social Preferences," CEPR Discussion Papers 5127, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Carmelo Rodriguez-Alvarez, 2005. "Strategy-Proof Coalition Formation," Economics Working Papers we055525, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
  4. Tania Singer & Ernst Fehr, 2005. "The Neuroeconomics of Mind Reading and Empathy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(2), pages 340-345, May.
  5. Eric Weese, 2013. "Political Mergers as Coalition Formation: An Analysis of the Heisei Municipal Amalgamations," Working Papers 1022, Economic Growth Center, Yale University.
  6. Casajus, André, 2008. "On the stability of coalition structures," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 271-274, August.
  7. Falk, Armin & Fehr, Ernst & Zehnder, Christian, 2005. "The Behavioural Effects of Minimum Wages," CEPR Discussion Papers 5115, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  8. Hannu Vartiainen, 2008. "Dynamic stable set," Discussion Papers 33, Aboa Centre for Economics.
  9. Hans Gersbach & Hans Haller, 2011. "Bargaining cum voice," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 36(2), pages 199-225, February.
  10. Hannu Vartiainen, 2008. "One-deviation principle in coalition formation," Discussion Papers 35, Aboa Centre for Economics.
  11. Hannu Vartiainen, 2007. "Dynamic Farsighted Stability," Discussion Papers 22, Aboa Centre for Economics.
  12. Vartiainen, Hannu, 2011. "Dynamic coalitional equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(2), pages 672-698, March.
  13. Weese, Eric, 2013. "Political Mergers as Coalition Formation: An Analysis of the Heisei Municipal Amalgamations," Working Papers 113, Yale University, Department of Economics.

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