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The hybrid solutions of an N-person game

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  • Zhao, Jingang

Abstract

We introduce a solution concept intermediate between the cooperative and noncooperative solutions of an n-person game in normal form. Consider a partition p of the players, with each s in p a coalition. A joint strategy x = {x_{s}|s in p} is a hybrid solution for the partition p if, for each s in p, x_{s} is a core solution of the corresponding parametric subgame, where this game is played by the players in s and is parameterized by x_{-s}, the strategies played by all outside players. This assumes that players behave cooperatively within each coalition and competitively across coalitions. Sufficient conditions are given for a general n-person game to have hybrid solutions for any partition.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 4 (1992)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 145-160

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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:4:y:1992:i:1:p:145-160

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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  1. Ichiishi, Tatsuro, 1981. "A Social Coalitional Equilibrium Existence Lemma," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(2), pages 369-77, March.
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Cited by:
  1. Kóczy Á., László, 2006. "A Neumann-féle játékelmélet
    [Neumanns game theory]
    ," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(1), pages 31-45.
  2. Diamantoudi, Effrosyni & Xue, Licun, 2007. "Coalitions, agreements and efficiency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 105-125, September.
  3. Debraj Ray & Rajiv Vohra, 2013. "Coalition Formation," Working Papers 2013-1, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  4. Zhao, Jingang, 1996. "The hybrid equilibria and core selection in exchange economies with externalities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 387-407.
  5. Martinez, Emmanuel & Tazdaït, Tarik & Tovar, Elisabeth, 2008. "Participative democracy and local environmental issues," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1-2), pages 68-79, December.
  6. Jingang Zhao, 1998. "Non-Empty Core as a Precondition for Horizontal Merger: Core Existence without Using Balancedness," Working Papers 98-07, Ohio State University, Department of Economics.
  7. Sonja Brangewitz & Sarah Brockhoff, 2012. "Stability of Coalitional Equilibria within Repeated Tax Competition," Working Papers 461, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
  8. Beth Allen, 2000. "The Future of Microeconomic Theory," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(1), pages 143-150, Winter.
  9. Jingang Zhao, 2009. "Estimating Merging Costs by Merger Preconditions," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 66(4), pages 373-399, April.
  10. repec:pdn:wpaper:48 is not listed on IDEAS
  11. Sonja Brangewitz & Sarah Brockhoff, 2012. "Stability of Coalitional Equilibria within Repeated Tax Competition," Working Papers CIE 48, University of Paderborn, CIE Center for International Economics.
  12. Hafalir, Isa E., 2007. "Efficiency in coalition games with externalities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 242-258, November.
  13. Alejandro Capparros & Eric Giraud-Heraud & Abdelhakim Hammoudi & Tarik Tazdaït, 2011. "Coalition stability with heterogeneous agents," Working Papers 41241, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique, France.
  14. Ferreira, Jose Luis, 1999. "Endogenous Formation of Coalitions in Noncooperative Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 40-58, January.
  15. Subhadip Chakrabarti & Robert Gilles & Emiliya Lazarova, 2011. "Strategic behavior under partial cooperation," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 71(2), pages 175-193, August.
  16. Eric Howe & Jingang Zhao, 2004. "Merger Incentives and Inverse Matrices from Bertrand Competition," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 586, Econometric Society.
  17. Nessah, Rabia & Tazdaı¨t, Tarik, 2013. "Absolute optimal solution for a compact and convex game," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 224(2), pages 353-361.
  18. McCain, Roger A., 2008. "Cooperative games and cooperative organizations," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 37(6), pages 2155-2167, December.

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