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When does universal peace prevail? Secession and group formation in conflict

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Author Info
Francis Bloch ()
Santiago Sánchez-Pagés ()
Raphaël Soubeyran

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Abstract

This paper analyzes secession and group formation in the general model of contests due to Esteban and Ray (1999). This model encompasses as special cases rent seeking contests and policy conflicts, where agents lobby over the choice of a policy in a one-dimensional policy space. We show that in both models the grand coalition is the efficient coalition structure and agents are always better off in the grand coalition than in a contest among singletons. Individual agents (in the rent seeking contest) and extremists (in the policy conflict) only have an incentive to secede when they anticipate that their secession will not be followed by additional secessions. Incentives to secede are lower when agents cooperate inside groups. The grand coalition emerges as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of a sequential game of coalition formation in rent seeking contests. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2006

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10101-005-0099-9
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Economics of Governance.

Volume (Year): 7 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (01)
Pages: 3-29
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Handle: RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:7:y:2006:i:1:p:3-29

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Related research
Keywords: Secession; group formation; rent seeking contests; policy conflicts;

Cited by:
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  1. Santiago Sanchez-Pages, 2007. "Endogenous Coalition Formation in Contests," ESE Discussion Papers 158, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Michelle R. Garfinkel & Stergios Skaperdas, 2006. "Economics of Conflict: An Overview," Working Papers 050623, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics, revised Sep 2006. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Vincent Anesi, 2009. "Moral hazard and free riding in collective action," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 197-219, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
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