Olson vs. Coase: Coalitional worth in conflict
AbstractWe analyze a model of conflict with endogenous choice of effort, where subsets of the contenders may force the resolution to be sequential: First the alliance fights it out with the rest and – in case they win – later they fight it out among themselves. For three-player games, we find that it will not be in the interest of any two of them to form an alliance. We obtain this result under two different scenarios: equidistant preferences with varying relative strengths, and vicinity of preferences with equal distribution of power. We conclude that the commonly made assumption of super-additive coalitional worth is suspect.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra in its series Economics Working Papers with number 645.
Date of creation: Sep 2002
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Coalition formation; conflict; alliance;
Other versions of this item:
- Joan Mª Esteban & József Sákovics, 2003. "Olson vs. Coase: Coalitional Worth in Conflict," Working Papers 3, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Joan Esteban & Jozsef Sakovics, 2004. "Olson vs. Coase: coalitional worth in conflict," ESE Discussion Papers 81, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2002-10-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2002-10-23 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2002-10-23 (Positive Political Economics)
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