This file is part of IDEAS , which uses RePEc data
[ Papers |
Articles |
Software |
Books |
Chapters |
Authors |
Institutions |
JEL Classification |
NEP reports |
Search |
New papers by email |
Author registration |
Rankings |
Volunteers |
FAQ |
Blog |
Help! ]
A Theory of Rent Seeking with Informational Foundations Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Lagerlöf, Johan N.M.
Additional information is available for the following
registered author(s):
I develop a model of rent seeking with informational foundations and an arbitrary number of rent seekers, and I compare the results with Tullock's (1980) classic model where the influence activities are "black-boxed." Given the microfoundations, the welfare consequences of rent seeking can be studied. In particular, I show that competition among rent seekers can be socially beneficial, since the additional information that the decision maker gets access to makes the increase in rent-seeking expenditures worthwhile. However, the analysis also highlights a logic that, under natural parameter assumptions, makes the rent seekers spend more resources on rent seeking than is in society's interest, which is consistent with the spirit of the rent-seeking literature.
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page . Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number
5893.
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
(with abstract ),
plain text
(with abstract ),
BibTeX ,
RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite),
ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Oct 2006Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5893Contact details of provider: Postal: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 53--56 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DG Phone: 44 - 20 - 7183 8801 Fax: 44 - 20 - 7183 8820
Order Information: Email:
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: ().
Keywords: competition ; disclosure ; information acquisition ; rent seeking ; welfare ; Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Monopoly D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports :
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Tullock, Gordon, 1975.
"On the Efficient Organization of Trials ,"
Kyklos ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 28(4), pages 745-62.
Lagerlof, Johan N.M. & Heidhues, Paul, 2005.
"On the desirability of an efficiency defense in merger control ,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization ,
Elsevier, vol. 23(9-10), pages 803-827, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Johan N. M. Lagerlöf & Paul Heidhues, 2004.
"On the Desirability of an Efficiency Defense in Merger Control ,"
Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics
04/24, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Oct 2004.
[Downloadable!] Johan Lagerlöf & Paul Heidhues, 2002.
"On the Desirability of an Efficeincy Defense in Merger Control ,"
CIG Working Papers
FS IV 02-08, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
[Downloadable!] Heidhues, Paul & Lagerlöf, Johan N.M., 2003.
"On the Desirability of an Efficiency Defense in Merger Control ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
3841, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Lars Frisell & Johan N. M. Lagerlöf, 2007.
"A Model of Reputation in Cheap Talk ,"
Scandinavian Journal of Economics ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 109(1), pages 49-70, 03.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Paul R. Milgrom & John Roberts, 1985.
"Relying on the Information of Interested Parties ,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
749, Cowles Foundation, Yale University.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Lohmann, Susanne, 1994.
"Information Aggregation through Costly Political Action ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 518-30, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Nitzan, Shmuel, 1994.
"Modelling rent-seeking contests ,"
European Journal of Political Economy ,
Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 41-60, May.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Morten Bennedsen & Sven E. Feldmann, 2002.
"Lobbying Legislatures ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(4), pages 919-948, August.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Potters, Jan & van Winden, Frans, 1992.
" Lobbying and Asymmetric Information ,"
Public Choice ,
Springer, vol. 74(3), pages 269-92, October.
Posner, Richard A, 1975.
"The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(4), pages 807-27, August.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1991.
"The Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture ,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics ,
MIT Press, vol. 106(4), pages 1089-127, November.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Krueger, Anne O, 1974.
"The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 64(3), pages 291-303, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Becker, Gary S, 1983.
"A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence ,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics ,
MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400, August.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full
references
Access and
download statistics Did you know? You too can volunteer for RePEc, for example by editing a NEP report.
This page was last updated on 2009-10-29.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics , College of Liberal Arts and Sciences , University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics .