On Rent Seeking and Inclusiveness
AbstractUsing an extension of a standard rent-seeking model, this paper shows that "inclusiveness", as defined and measured in the text, is the property of a political system that motivates government to deter destructive rent seeking. Highly-inclusive polities are likely to be democracies since dictatorships lack a key prerequisite for inclusiveness. However, democracies are not necessarily highly inclusive.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Carleton University, Department of Economics in its series Carleton Economic Papers with number 09-05.
Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: 26 Aug 2009
Date of revision: 18 Apr 2013
Publication status: Published: Carleton Economic Papers
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H00 - Public Economics - - General - - - General
- H19 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Other
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