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Intellectual foundations of public choice, the forest from the trees

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  • Roger D. Congleton

    (West Virginia University)

Abstract

After War World II, a group of scholars began using rational choice models from economics and game theory to examine the manner in which public policies would be determined if men and women were as “rational” in their political activities as they were in other spheres of life. The implications of such an approach to politics were not obvious and took decades to be worked out. Indeed, they are still being worked out. The result was a new field of research that deepened our understanding of economic and political systems and their many interdependencies. This review essay provides an overview of the core findings of public choice during its first half century and of the boot-strapping process through which those findings emerged. Those core findings provide the idea base and results that ground most contemporary public choice research.

Suggested Citation

  • Roger D. Congleton, 2018. "Intellectual foundations of public choice, the forest from the trees," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 175(3), pages 229-244, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:175:y:2018:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-018-0545-1
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-018-0545-1
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    Cited by:

    1. Pijus Krūminas, 2019. "Public R&D under different electoral rules: evidence from OECD countries," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 30(3), pages 300-329, September.
    2. Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, 2018. "Public choice and political science: a view from Europe," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 175(3), pages 245-257, June.
    3. Congleton, Roger D., 2020. "The institutions of international treaty organizations as evidence for social contract theory," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    4. Gregory DeAngelo & Bryan C. McCannon, 2020. "Psychological game theory in public choice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 182(1), pages 159-180, January.
    5. Marianne Johnson, 2018. "Rules versus authorities," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 175(3), pages 219-228, June.
    6. Long Zhang & John A. Parnell & Chuanhui Xiong, 2021. "Market and Nonmarket Strategies (NMS) in China: Performance Payoffs in Turbulent Environments," Asian Business & Management, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 20(5), pages 644-665, November.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public choice; Science as a spontaneous order; Bootstrapping; Methodology; Key results; Theory of elections; Theory of interest groups; Constitutional political economy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B2 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government

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