For many countries in the world today and for much of history, investment in ordinary productive capital has been overshadowed by investment in enforcive capital: castles and siege machines; tanks, missiles and army barracks. We introduce a dynamic model which allows for investment in the latter form of capital, in which competing groups contest output through their holdings of enforcive capital. We show how investment in productive capital declines in relation to enforcive investment as the number of competing groups increases, and how this leads to a decline in steady-state output and welfare.
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Paper provided by California Irvine - School of Social Sciences in its series Papers with number
97-98-20.
Find related papers by JEL classification: E22 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomics: Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Capital; Investment; Capacity
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Michelle R. Garfinkel & Stergios Skaperdas, 2006.
"Economics of Conflict: An Overview,"
Working Papers
050623, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics, revised Sep 2006.
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