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Multiple-Issue Bargaining and Axiomatic Solutions

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Author Info

  • Clara Ponsati

    ()
    (Department d'Economia i Historia Econoica, Universitat Autonoma, Barcelona 08193, Spain, e-mail: cponsati@cc.uab.es)

  • Joel Watson

    ()
    (Department of Economics, 0508, University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, CA 92093-0508, USA, e-mail: jwatson@weber.ucsd.edu)

Abstract

We study two-person, multiple-issue bargaining problems and identify four procedures by which the bargaining may take place. Drawing on some logic from non-cooperative game theory, we propose axioms which relate the outcomes of the procedures. We also promote a weak monotonicity axiom on solutions, called issue-by-issue monotonicity, which is geared toward multiple-issue bargaining. Our main result concerns the relationship between a sequential bargaining procedure - with the rule that agreements are implemented only after all issues are resolved - and global bargaining (in which all issues are negotiated simultaneously). If a bargaining solution predicts the same outcome with these two procedures, then we say that it satisfies agenda independence. We prove that a solution satisfies axioms of efficiency, symmetry, scale invariance, issue-by-issue monotonicity, and agenda independence if and only if it is the Nash solutions. This result provides new intuition for Nash's independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom. Among other results, we show that a solution is invariant to all four of the procedures and satisfies efficiency and symmetry if and only if it is the utilitarian solution with equal weights. We comment on the results of other authors who address multiple-issue bargaining.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.

Volume (Year): 26 (1998)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Pages: 501-524

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Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:26:y:1998:i:4:p:501-524

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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00182/index.htm

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Cited by:
  1. Busch, Lutz-Alexander & Horstmann, Ignatius J., 2002. "The game of negotiations: ordering issues and implementing agreements," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 169-191, November.
  2. O'Neill, Barry & Samet, Dov & Wiener, Zvi & Winter, Eyal, 2004. "Bargaining with an agenda," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 139-153, July.
  3. Joan Esteban & Jozsef Sakovics, 2004. "Why do lions get the lion's share? A Hobbesian theory of agreements," ESE Discussion Papers 37, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  4. de Clippel, Geoffroy & Bejan, Camelia, 2011. "No profitable decompositions in quasi-linear allocation problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(5), pages 1995-2012, September.
  5. Joan Esteban & Jozsef Sakovics, 2005. "A theory of agreements in the shadow of conflict," ESE Discussion Papers 139, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  6. Amparo M. Mármol Conde & Clara Ponsatí Obiols, 2006. "Bargaining Multiple Issues with Leximin Preferences," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2006/05, Centro de Estudios Andaluces.
  7. Joan Esteban & József Sákovics, 2008. "A Theory of Agreements in the Shadow of Conflict: The Genesis of Bargaining Power," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 65(3), pages 227-252, November.
  8. Joan Esteban & József Sákovics, 2003. "Endogenous bargaining power," Working Papers 13, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.

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