This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Conflict as a Part of the Bargaining Process: Theory and Empirical Evidence

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Santiago Sanchez-Pages ()

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

This paper explores the role of conflict as a bargaining tool. It first presents a simple bargaining model with one-sided incomplete information. Parties can choose the scope of the confrontation they may want to engage in: A limited conflict that only introduces delay, or an absolute conflict that terminates the game. The outcomes of both types of confrontation are driven by the relative strength of the parties that is only known to one of them. Therefore, the non-final conflict conveys information about the eventual outcome of the absolute one. In this framework, it is shown that confrontation has a double-edged effect: It may paradoxically open the door to agreement when the uninformed party is so optimistic that no agreement is feasible. But it can also create inefficiency when agreement is possible but the informed agent has an incentive to improve her bargaining position by fighting. The second part of the paper performs a duration analysis on a sample of colonial and imperial wars fought between 1817 and 1988. The results offer evidence illustrating the use of conflict in negotiations.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.econ.ed.ac.uk/papers/ConflictBargaining.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh in its series ESE Discussion Papers with number 129.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 34
Date of creation: Nov 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:edn:esedps:129

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 50 George Square, EH8 9JY, Edinburgh
Phone: +44(0)1316508361
Fax: +44(0)1316504514
Web page: http://www.econ.ed.ac.uk/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Santiago Sanchez-Pages).

Related research
Keywords: Conflict; Bargaining; Incomplete information; Duration analysis.;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C41 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Duration Analysis
C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
J52 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation
K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Mnookin, Robert & Wilson, Robert, 1998. "A Model of Efficient Discovery," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 219-250, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Powell, Robert, 1996. "Bargaining in the Shadow of Power," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 255-289, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Kennan, John & Wilson, Robert, 1989. "Strategic Bargaining Models and Interpretation of Strike Data," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 4(S), pages S87-130, Supplemen. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Anbarci, Nejat & Skaperdas, Stergios & Syropoulos, Constantinos, 2002. "Comparing Bargaining Solutions in the Shadow of Conflict: How Norms against Threats Can Have Real Effects," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(1), pages 1-16, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Thomas, Jonathan M, 1996. "On the Interpretation of Covariate Estimates in Independent Competing-Risks Models," Bulletin of Economic Research, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 48(1), pages 27-39, January.
  6. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Bester, Helmut & Wärneryd, Karl, 1998. "Conflict Resolution Under Asymmetric Information," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 264, Stockholm School of Economics.
    Other versions:
  8. Myerson, Roger B. & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1983. "Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 265-281, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Kiefer, Nicholas M, 1988. "Economic Duration Data and Hazard Functions," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 26(2), pages 646-79, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Joan Esteban & József Sákovics, 2002. "Endogenous Bargaining Power," Economics Working Papers 644, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
  11. Cramton, Peter C & Tracy, Joseph S, 1992. "Strikes and Holdouts in Wage Bargaining: Theory and Data," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 100-121, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  12. Fernandez, Raquel & Glazer, Jacob, 1991. "Striking for a Bargain between Two Completely Informed Agents," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 240-52, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  13. Schnell, John F & Gramm, Cynthia L, 1987. "Learning by Striking: Estimates of the Teetotaler Effect," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 5(2), pages 221-41, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Horowitz, Andrew W, 1993. "Time Paths of Land Reform: A Theoretical Model of Reform Dynamics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(4), pages 1003-10, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Stergios Skaperdas, 2007. "An Economic Approach to Analyzing Civil War," Working Papers 060715, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Santiago Sanchez-Pages, 2004. "The use of conflict as a bargaining tool against unsophisticated opponents," ESE Discussion Papers 99, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? There is a FAQ (frequently asked questions).

This page was last updated on 2009-11-4.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.