References listed on IDEAS
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1. Robert C. Feenstra & Jagdish N. Bhagwati, 1982. "Tariff Seeking and the Efficient Tariff," NBER Chapters, in: Import Competition and Response, pages 245-262 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!]
2. Coggins, Jay S & Graham-Tomasi, Theodore & Roe, Terry L, 1991. "Existence of Equilibrium in a Lobbying Economy," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 32(3), pages 533-50, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Sen, Amartya K, 1979. "Personal Utilities and Public Judgements: Or What's Wrong with Welfare Economics?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 89(355), pages 537-58, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Chun, Youngsub, 1988. "Nash solution and timing of bargaining," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 27-31. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-50, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 1992. "Protection For Sale," NBER Working Papers 4149, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1992. "Protection for Sale," Papers 21-92, Tel Aviv.
   • Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1992. "Protection for Sale," Papers 162, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
   • Grossman, Gene & Helpman, Elhanan, 1993. "Protection for Sale," CEPR Discussion Papers 827, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Harsanyi, John C, 1995. "Games with Incomplete Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 291-303, June.
   Other versions:
   • Harsanyi, John C., 1994. "Games with Incomplete Information," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 1994-1, Nobel Prize Committee. [Downloadable!]
7. Ng, Yew-Kwang, 1981. "Bentham or Nash? On the Acceptable Form of Social Welfare Functions," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 57(158), pages 238-50, September.
8. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. Carlsson, Hans, 1991. "A Bargaining Model Where Parties Make Errors," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(5), pages 1487-96, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. Alvin E Roth, 2008. "Axiomatic Models of Bargaining," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000002376, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
11. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. Ken Binmore & Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1986. "The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(2), pages 176-188, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
13. Findlay, Ronald & Wellisz, Stanislaw, 1983. "Some Aspects of the Political Economy of Trade Restrictions," Kyklos, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 36(3), pages 469-81.
14. Aumann, Robert J & Kurz, Mordecai, 1977. "Power and Taxes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(5), pages 1137-61, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
15. Baldwin, Richard, 1987. "Politically realistic objective functions and trade policy PROFs and tariffs," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 287-290. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
16. Roth, Alvin E., 1977. "Independence of irrelevant alternatives, and solutions to Nash's bargaining problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 247-251, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
17. Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 533-54, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
18. Wellisz, Stanislaw & Wilson, John D., 1986. "Lobbying and tariff formation: A deadweight loss consideration," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(3-4), pages 367-375, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
19. Hillman, Arye L, 1982. "Declining Industries and Political-Support Protectionist Motives," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 1180-87, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
20. Neary, J Peter, 1978. "Short-Run Capital Specificity and the Pure Theory of International Trade," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 88(351), pages 488-510, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
21. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
22. Chun, Youngsub & Thomson, William, 1990. "Nash solution and uncertain disagreement points," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 213-223, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Chun, Y. & Thomson, W., 1988. "Nash Solution And Uncertain Disagreement Points," RCER Working Papers 134, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
23. Van Long, Ngo & Vousden, Neil, 1991. "Protectionist responses and declining industries," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1-2), pages 87-103, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
24. Thomson, William, 1981. "A class of solutions to bargaining problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 431-441, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
25. Svejnar, Jan, 1986. "Bargaining Power, Fear of Disagreement, and Wage Settlements: Theory and Evidence from U.S. Industry," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1055-78, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Svejnar, J., 1984. "Bargaining power, fear of disagreement and wage settlements: theory and evidence from U.S. industry," CORE Discussion Papers 1984037, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).