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A Bargaining Model Where Parties Make Errors

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  • Carlsson, Hans

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.

Volume (Year): 59 (1991)
Issue (Month): 5 (September)
Pages: 1487-96

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Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:59:y:1991:i:5:p:1487-96

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Cited by:
  1. Carlsson, Hans & van Damme, Eric, 1993. "Global Games and Equilibrium Selection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 989-1018, September.
  2. Andersson, Ola & Argenton, Cédric & Weibull, Jörgen, 2010. "Robustness to strategic uncertainty in price competition," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 0726, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 08 Apr 2010.
  3. Nejat Anbarci & Ching-jen Sun, 2012. "Asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solutions: A Simple Nash Program," Economics Series 2012_9, Deakin University, Faculty of Business and Law, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance.
  4. David Malueg, 2010. "Mixed-strategy equilibria in the Nash Demand Game," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 44(2), pages 243-270, August.
  5. Britz, Volker & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Predtetchinski, Arkadi, 2010. "Non-cooperative support for the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(5), pages 1951-1967, September.
  6. Carlsson, Hans & Dasgupta, Sudipto, 1997. "Noise-Proof Equilibria in Two-Action Signaling Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 432-460, December.
  7. Hom M Pant, 1996. "Endogenous Behaviour of the Tariff Rate in a Political Economy," International Trade 9609001, EconWPA, revised 01 Oct 1996.
  8. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2000. "Global Games: Theory and Applications," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1275, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  9. Murali Agastya, 1995. "An Evolutionary Bargaining Model," Game Theory and Information 9503001, EconWPA.
  10. Ganslandt, Mattias & Carlsson, Hans, 1997. "Noisy Equilibrium Selection in Coordination Games," Working Paper Series 485, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
  11. Dutta, Rohan, 2012. "Bargaining with revoking costs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 144-153.
  12. Juana Santamaria-Garcia, 2004. "Equilibrium Selection In The Nash Demand Game. An Evolutionary Approach," Working Papers. Serie AD 2004-34, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  13. Yi, Kang-Oh, 1999. "A Quantal Response Equilibrium Model of Order Statistic Games," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt4771x1j2, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.

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