Existence of Equilibrium in a Lobbying Economy
AbstractThis paper establishes the existence of equilibrium in a model with a central authority that sets relative prices in response to agents' political activity. To a small open economy the authors graft a government price-setting program that responds to the lobbying pressure of opposing interests. The proof involves reformulating the lobbying economy as a noncooperative generalized game, establishing the existence of an equilibrium in the economy. Agents' choice sets are found to be nonconvex, a difficulty that the authors resolve by an appropriate restriction on preferences. Copyright 1991 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association in its journal International Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 32 (1991)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
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- Ho, Shirley J., 2007. "Impacts of interest groups: Endogenous interaction and lobbying limits," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 506-522, May.
- Potters, J.J.M. & Winden, F.A.A.M. van, 1996. "Models of interest groups: Four different approaches," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-73372, Tilburg University.
- Gilles, R.P., 1999. "Coalitional Provision of Pure Collective Goods," Discussion Paper 1999-47, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Kinsey, Jean D. & Ndayisenga, Fidele, 1999. "The Impact Of Political Contributions By Food Manufacturing Firms On U.S. Farm Policy," Journal of Agribusiness, Agricultural Economics Association of Georgia, vol. 17(1).
- Hom M Pant, 1996. "Endogenous Behaviour of the Tariff Rate in a Political Economy," International Trade 9609001, EconWPA, revised 01 Oct 1996.
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