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The Impact Of Political Contributions By Food Manufacturing Firms On U.S. Farm Policy

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  • Kinsey, Jean D.
  • Ndayisenga, Fidele

Abstract

This study generates an econometric model of the allocation of political contributions by food firms. It combines information about food firms' total expenditures for political influence with the behavioral assumption of profit maximization to test the hypothesis that food manufacturing firms do not lobby against farm policies. The results support the hypothesis. The inferences are conditional on the effects observed in the sample. The conclusions from this analysis may not be widely generalizable, but they do inform hypotheses about the intentions of food firms that participate in the political market.

Suggested Citation

  • Kinsey, Jean D. & Ndayisenga, Fidele, 1999. "The Impact Of Political Contributions By Food Manufacturing Firms On U.S. Farm Policy," Journal of Agribusiness, Agricultural Economics Association of Georgia, vol. 17(1), pages 1-15.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:jloagb:14678
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.14678
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Serrao, Amilcar, 2002. "Influence of Political Campaign Contributions by American Agribusiness Firms on U.S. Farm Policy," 2002 International Congress, August 28-31, 2002, Zaragoza, Spain 24855, European Association of Agricultural Economists.

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    Keywords

    Agricultural and Food Policy; Agribusiness;

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