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A social choice rule and its implementation in perfect equilibrium

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  • Howard, J. V.
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

    Volume (Year): 56 (1992)
    Issue (Month): 1 (February)
    Pages: 142-159

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:56:y:1992:i:1:p:142-159

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

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    Cited by:
    1. John Conley & Simon Wilkie, 1994. "Implementing the nash extension bargaining solution for non-convex problems," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 205-216, December.
    2. Walter Trockel, 1999. "Integrating the Nash Program into Mechanism Theory," UCLA Economics Working Papers 787, UCLA Department of Economics.
    3. Nejat Anbarci & John H. Boyd III, 2008. "Nash Demand Game and the Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution," Economics Series 2008_11, Deakin University, Faculty of Business and Law, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance.
    4. Roberto Serrano, 2004. "Fifty Years of the Nash Program, 1953-2003," Working Papers 2004-20, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    5. Eiichi Miyagawa, 2002. "Subgame-perfect implementation of bargaining solutions," Discussion Papers 0102-16, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
    6. Trockel,W., 2001. "Can and should the Nash program be looked at as a part of mechanism theory?," Working Papers 322, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
    7. Trockel,W., 1999. "On the Nash program for the Nash bargaining solution," Working Papers 306, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
    8. Anbarci, Nejat & Sun, Ching-jen, 2013. "Robustness of intermediate agreements and bargaining solutions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 367-376.
    9. Bergin, James & Duggan, John, 1999. "An Implementation-Theoretic Approach to Non-cooperative Foundations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 50-76, May.
    10. Nejat Anbarci & Ching-jen Sun, 2012. "Asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solutions: A Simple Nash Program," Economics Series 2012_9, Deakin University, Faculty of Business and Law, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance.
    11. Claus-Jochen Haake & Walter Trockel, 2010. "On Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 17-25, March.
    12. Spinnewijn, Johannes & Spinnewyn, Frans, 2008. "Revising claims and resisting ultimatums in bargaining problems," Open Access publications from Katholieke Universiteit Leuven urn:hdl:123456789/211395, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven.

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