Would I lie to you? On social preferences and lying aversion
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Bibliographic Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Experimental Economics.
Volume (Year): 12 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 180-192
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102888
Related research
Keywords: Experimental economics; Lying; Deception; Social preferences; C91;Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
References
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Joeri Sol, 2010. "Peer Evaluation: Incentives and Co-Worker Relations," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 10-055/1, Tinbergen Institute.
- Rode, Julian, 2010. "Truth and trust in communication: Experiments on the effect of a competitive context," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 325-338, January.
- Holm, Håkan J., 2010. "Truth and lie detection in bluffing," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 318-324, November.
- Santiago Sánchez-Pagés & Marc Vorsatz, 2009.
"Enjoy the silence: an experiment on truth-telling,"
Experimental Economics,
Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 220-241, June.
- Santiago Sanchez-Pages & Marc Vorsatz, 2007. "Enjoy the Silence: An Experiment on Truth-Telling," ESE Discussion Papers 155, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
- Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2011.
"Partially-honest Nash implementation: Characterization results,"
MPRA Paper
28838, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2011. "Partially-honest Nash implementation: Characterization results," Discussion Paper Series 555, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
- Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2011. "Partially-honest Nash implementation: Characterization results," CCES Discussion Paper Series 43, Center for Research on Contemporary Economic Systems, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
- Vera Popva, 2010. "What renders financial advisors less treacherous? - On commissions and reciprocity -," Jena Economic Research Papers 2010-036, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
- López-Pérez, Raúl, 2008. "The Power of Words: Why Communication fosters Cooperation and Efficiency," Working Papers in Economic Theory 2009/01, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid (Spain), Department of Economic Analysis (Economic Theory and Economic History).
- Li Hao & Daniel Houser, 2011. "Honest Lies," Working Papers 1021, George Mason University, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science.
- Belot, Michèle & Bhaskar, V. & van de Ven, Jeroen, 2010. "Promises and cooperation: Evidence from a TV game show," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 73(3), pages 396-405, March.
- Serra Garcia, M. & Damme, E.E.C. van & Potters, J.J.M., 2010. "Which Words Bond? An Experiment on Signaling in a Public Good Game (replaced by CentER DP 2011-139)," Discussion Paper 2010-33, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Serra Garcia, M. & Damme, E.E.C. van & Potters, J.J.M., 2011. "Lying About What you Know or About What you do? (replaces TILEC DP 2010-016)," Discussion Paper 2011-055, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
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