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Lies and Biased Evaluation: A Real-Effort Experiment

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  • Rosaz, Julie

    ()
    (University of Montpellier 1)

  • Villeval, Marie Claire

    ()
    (CNRS, GATE)

Abstract

This paper presents the results of a laboratory experiment in which workers perform a real-effort task and supervisors report the workers’ performance to the experimenter. The report is non verifiable and determines the earnings of both the supervisor and the worker. We find that not all the supervisors, but at least one third of them bias their report. Both selfish black lies (increasing the supervisor's earnings while decreasing the worker's payoff) and Pareto white lies (increasing the earnings of both) according to Erat and Gneezy (2009)'s terminology are frequent. In contrast, spiteful black lies (decreasing the earnings of both) and altruistic white lies (increasing the earnings of workers but decreasing those of the supervisor) are almost non-existent. The supervisors' second-order beliefs and their decision to lie are highly correlated, suggesting that guilt aversion plays a role.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 5884.

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Length: 44 pages
Date of creation: Jul 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp5884

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Keywords: experiments; lies; evaluation; lie-aversion; guilt aversion; self-image; deception;

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References

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Cited by:
  1. Filippin, A. & Crosetto, P., 2014. "A reconsideration of gender differences in risk attitudes," Working Papers, Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL) 2014-01, Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL).
  2. Jingnan (Cecilia) Chen & Daniel Houser, 2013. "Promises and Lies: An Experiment on Detecting Deception," Working Papers, George Mason University, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science 1038, George Mason University, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science, revised Feb 2013.

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