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Promises and cooperation: Evidence from a TV game show

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Author Info

  • Belot, Michèle
  • Bhaskar, V.
  • van de Ven, Jeroen

Abstract

We study the role of communication in a high stakes prisoner's dilemma, using data from a television game show. 40 Percent of the players voluntarily promise to cooperate, and these players are 50 percentage points more likely to cooperate than players who do not volunteer a promise. However, promises that arise in response to an explicit question by the presenter of the show are uninformative about behavior. These results augment and qualify recent experimental findings on communication--people do not want to volunteer lies but may have no compunction in lying if they feel compelled to do so.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.

Volume (Year): 73 (2010)
Issue (Month): 3 (March)
Pages: 396-405

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:73:y:2010:i:3:p:396-405

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jebo

Related research

Keywords: Cheap talk Communication Promises Cooperation;

References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Donja Darai & Silvia Grätz, 2012. "Attraction and cooperative behavior," ECON - Working Papers 082, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Dec 2012.
  2. Grätz, Silvia & Darai, Donja, 2011. "Determinants of Successful Cooperation in a Face-to-Face Social Dilemma," Annual Conference 2011 (Frankfurt, Main): The Order of the World Economy - Lessons from the Crisis 48702, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  3. Gurevich, Gregory & Kliger, Doron, 2013. "The Manipulation: Socio-economic decision making," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 171-184.
  4. López-Pérez, Raúl, 2012. "The power of words: A model of honesty and fairness," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 642-658.
  5. Jingnan (Cecilia) Chen & Daniel Houser, 2013. "Promises and Lies: An Experiment on Detecting Deception," Working Papers 1038, George Mason University, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science, revised Feb 2013.

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