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Social norms, third-party observation and third-party reward

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Author Info
Matthias Sutter ()
Peter Lindner ()
Daniela Platsch ()

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Abstract

This paper examines the influence of third-party observation and third-party reward on behavior in an experimental prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game. Whereas the existing literature on third-party intervention as a means to sustain social norms has dealt almost exclusively with third-party punishment, we show that both third-party observation and third-party reward have positive effects on cooperation rates, compared to a treatment where no third party is involved. Third-party reward is more effective in increasing cooperation than third-party observation. However, rewards are given too late to prevent a steady downward trend of cooperation rates.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck in its series Working Papers with number 2009-08.

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Length: 25
Date of creation: Apr 2009
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Handle: RePEc:inn:wpaper:2009-08

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Related research
Keywords: Social norms; third-party reward; third-party observation; prisoner’s dilemma experiment;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, 2004. "Third-party punishment and social norms," Experimental 0409002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Charness, Gary & Cobo-Reyes, Ramón & Jiménez, Natalia, 2008. "An investment game with third-party intervention," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 18-28, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Rupert Sausgruber, 2009. "A note on peer effects between teams," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 193-201, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Herbert Gintis, 2000. "Strong Reciprocity and Human Sociality," Working Papers 2000-02, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Martin Sefton & Robert Shupp & James M. Walker, 2007. "The Effect Of Rewards And Sanctions In Provision Of Public Goods," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 45(4), pages 671-690, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Kahneman, Daniel & Knetsch, Jack L & Thaler, Richard, 1986. "Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(4), pages 728-41, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-6.

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