Social norms, third-party observation and third-party reward
AbstractThis paper examines the influence of third-party observation and third-party reward on behavior in an experimental prisoner?s dilemma (PD) game. Whereas the existing literature on third-party intervention as a means to sustain social norms has dealt almost exclusively with third-party punishment, we show that both third-party observation and third-party reward have positive effects on cooperation rates, compared to a treatment where no third party is involved. Third-party reward is more effective in increasing cooperation than third-party observation. However, rewards are given too late to prevent a steady downward trend of cooperation rates.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck in its series Working Papers with number 2009-08.
Date of creation: Apr 2009
Date of revision:
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More information through EDIRC
Social norms; third-party reward; third-party observation; prisoner?s dilemma experiment;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-04-18 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2009-04-18 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-CDM-2009-04-18 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-EVO-2009-04-18 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2009-04-18 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2009-04-18 (Game Theory)
- NEP-SOC-2009-04-18 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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