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Trust, reciprocity, and contract enforcement : experiments on satisfaction guaranteed

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Author Info
Andreoni,J. (University of Wisconsin-Madison, Social Systems Research Institute)

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Paper provided by Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems in its series Working papers with number 7.

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Date of creation: 2005
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Handle: RePEc:att:wimass:20057

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Postal: UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON, SOCIAL SYSTEMS RESEARCH INSTITUTE(S.S.R.I.), MADISON WISCONSIN 53706 U.S.A.

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Uri Gneezy, 2005. "Deception: The Role of Consequences," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(1), pages 384-394, March. [Downloadable!]
  2. Steven N. Durlauf, 2002. "On the Empirics of Social Capital," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(483), pages 459-479, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Ernst Fehr & Klaus Schmidt, 2004. "Contracts, Fairness and Incentives," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000148, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Gary Charness & Matthew Rabin, 2002. "Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series 1042, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. repec:att:wimass:19959 is not listed on IDEAS
  7. Eckel, Catherine C. & Wilson, Rick K., 2004. "Is trust a risky decision?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 55(4), pages 447-465, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter & Georg Kirchsteiger, 1997. "Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device: Experimental Evidence," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(4), pages 833-860, July.
  9. John A. List, 2005. "The Behavioralist Meets the Market: Measuring Social Preferences and Reputation Effects in Actual Transactions," NBER Working Papers 11616, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Fehr, Ernst & Kirchsteiger, George & Riedl, Arno, 1993. "Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing? An Experimental Investigation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 108(2), pages 437-59, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, 1999. "A Theory Of Fairness, Competition, And Cooperation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 114(3), pages 817-868, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Knack, Stephen & Keefer, Philip, 1997. "Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1251-88, November.
  13. repec:att:wimass:1920025 is not listed on IDEAS
  14. Martin Brown & Armin Falk & Ernst Fehr, 2004. "Relational Contracts and the Nature of Market Interactions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(3), pages 747-780, 05. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  15. Zhao, Jinhua & Zilberman, David & Heiman, Amir & McWilliams, Bruce, 2002. "Modeling Money-back Guarantees as Financial Options," Staff General Research Papers 5206, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  16. Van Huyck John B. & Battalio Raymond C. & Walters Mary F., 1995. "Commitment versus Discretion in the Peasant-Dictator Game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 143-170, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Joel Sobel, 2005. "Interdependent Preferences and Reciprocity," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 43(2), pages 392-436, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Gneezy, Uri & Rustichini, Aldo, 2000. "A Fine is a Price," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 29(1), pages 1-17, January.
  19. Abigail Barr & Pieter Serneels, 2004. "Wages and Reciprocity in the Workplace," Development and Comp Systems 0409064, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  20. Fehr, Ernst, et al, 1998. "When Social Norms Overpower Competition: Gift Exchange in Experimental Labor Markets," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(2), pages 324-51, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  21. Edward L. Glaeser & David I. Laibson & José A. Scheinkman & Christine L. Soutter, 2000. "Measuring Trust," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 115(3), pages 811-846, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  22. Andreoni, James & Brown, Paul M. & Vesterlund, Lise, 2002. "What Makes an Allocation Fair? Some Experimental Evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 1-24, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  23. James Andreoni & William Harbaugh & Lise Vesterlund, 2003. "The Carrot or the Stick: Rewards, Punishments, and Cooperation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 893-902, June. [Downloadable!]
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  24. Engle-Warnick, Jim & Slonim, Robert L., 2004. "The evolution of strategies in a repeated trust game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 55(4), pages 553-573, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  25. Rabin, Matthew, 1993. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1281-1302, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  26. Berg Joyce & Dickhaut John & McCabe Kevin, 1995. "Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 122-142, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  27. Iris Bohnet & Bruno S. Frey & Steffen Huck, . "More Order with Less Law: On Contract Enforcement, Trust, and Crowding," IEW - Working Papers iewwp052, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
  28. Mann, Duncan P & Wissink, Jennifer P, 1990. "Money-Back Warranties vs. Replacement Warranties: A Simple Comparison," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(2), pages 432-36, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  29. Anke Kessler & Christoph Lülfesmann, 2004. "Bilateral bargaining, unverifiable quality, and options to return," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 395-410, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Rigdon, Mary, 2005. "Trust and reciprocity in incentive contracting," MPRA Paper 2007, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 15 May 2006. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Maroš Servátka & Steven Tucker & Radovan Vadovic, 2008. "Words Speak Louder Than Money," Working Papers in Economics 08/18, University of Canterbury, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Maroš Servátka & Steven Tucker & Radovan Vadovic, 2009. "Building Trust One Gift at a Time," Working Papers in Economics 09/11, University of Canterbury, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Jim Engle-Warnick & Andreas Leibbrandt, 2006. "Who Gets the Last Word? An Experimental Study of the Effect of a Peer Review Process on the Expression of Social Norms," CIRANO Working Papers 2006s-12, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Antoine Billot & Chantal Marlats, 2009. "Préferences psychologiques et nouvelle économie politique," PSE Working Papers 2009-04, PSE (Ecole normale supérieure). [Downloadable!]
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