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Trust, Reciprocity, and Contract Enforcement: Experiments on Satisfaction Guaranteed

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  • James Andreoni

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Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Levine's Bibliography with number 666156000000000679.

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Date of creation: 18 Mar 2005
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:666156000000000679

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  1. Matthew Rabin., 1992. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," Economics Working Papers, University of California at Berkeley 92-199, University of California at Berkeley.
  2. Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 1998. "A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 1812, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. James Andreoni & William Harbaugh & Lise Vesterlund, 2003. "The Carrot or the Stick: Rewards, Punishments, and Cooperation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 893-902, June.
  4. Che, Yeon-Koo, 1996. "Customer Return Policies for Experience Goods," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(1), pages 17-24, March.
  5. Anke Kessler & Christoph Lülfesmann, 2004. "Bilateral bargaining, unverifiable quality, and options to return," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 395-410, January.
  6. Abigail Barr & Pieter Serneels, 2004. "Wages and Reciprocity in the Workplace," CSAE Working Paper Series 2004-18, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
  7. Berg Joyce & Dickhaut John & McCabe Kevin, 1995. "Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 122-142, July.
  8. Charness, Gary B & Rabin, Matthew, 2001. "Understanding Social Preferences With Simple Tests," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt0dc3k4m5, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
  9. Steven N. Durlauf, 2002. "On the Empirics of Social Capital," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(483), pages 459-479, November.
  10. Georg Kirchsteiger & Ernst Fehr & Arno Riedl, 1993. "Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing? An Experimental Investigation," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/5927, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  11. Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 252, David K. Levine.
  12. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter & Georg Kirchsteiger, 1997. "Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device: Experimental Evidence," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 65(4), pages 833-860, July.
  13. Andreoni,J. & Castillo,M. & Petrie,R., 2000. "What do bargainers' preferences look like? : exploring a convex ultimatum game," Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems 25, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  14. Ernst Fehr & Klaus Schmidt, 2004. "Contracts, Fairness and Incentives," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000148, UCLA Department of Economics.
  15. John List, 2006. "The behavioralist meets the market: Measuring social preferences and reputation effects in actual transactions," Natural Field Experiments, The Field Experiments Website 00300, The Field Experiments Website.
  16. Gneezy, Uri & Rustichini, Aldo, 2000. "A Fine is a Price," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 29(1), pages 1-17, January.
  17. Gary E Bolton & Axel Ockenfels, 1997. "A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1889, David K. Levine.
  18. Martin Brown & Armin Falk & Ernst Fehr, 2004. "Relational Contracts and the Nature of Market Interactions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 72(3), pages 747-780, 05.
  19. Van Huyck John B. & Battalio Raymond C. & Walters Mary F., 1995. "Commitment versus Discretion in the Peasant-Dictator Game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 143-170, July.
  20. Andreoni, James & Brown, Paul M. & Vesterlund, Lise, 2002. "What Makes an Allocation Fair? Some Experimental Evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 1-24, July.
  21. Engle-Warnick, Jim & Slonim, Robert L., 2004. "The evolution of strategies in a repeated trust game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 55(4), pages 553-573, December.
  22. Edward L. Glaeser & David I. Laibson & José A. Scheinkman & Christine L. Soutter, 2000. "Measuring Trust," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 115(3), pages 811-846, August.
    • Glaeser, Edward Ludwig & Laibson, David I. & Scheinkman, Jose A. & Soutter, Christine L., 2000. "Measuring Trust," Scholarly Articles 4481497, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  23. Zhao, Jinhua & Zilberman, David & Heiman, Amir & McWilliams, Bruce, 2002. "Modeling Money-Back Guarantees As Financial Options," Staff General Research Papers, Iowa State University, Department of Economics 5206, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  24. Eckel, Catherine C. & Wilson, Rick K., 2004. "Is trust a risky decision?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 55(4), pages 447-465, December.
  25. Mann, Duncan P & Wissink, Jennifer P, 1990. "Money-Back Warranties vs. Replacement Warranties: A Simple Comparison," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 80(2), pages 432-36, May.
  26. Fehr, Ernst, et al, 1998. "When Social Norms Overpower Competition: Gift Exchange in Experimental Labor Markets," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(2), pages 324-51, April.
  27. Uri Gneezy, 2005. "Deception: The Role of Consequences," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 95(1), pages 384-394, March.
  28. Iris Bohnet & Bruno S. Frey & Steffen Huck, . "More Order with Less Law: On Contract Enforcement, Trust, and Crowding," IEW - Working Papers, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich 052, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  29. Knack, Stephen & Keefer, Philip, 1997. "Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1251-88, November.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Charness, Gary & Dufwenberg, Martin, 2010. "Bare promises: An experiment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 281-283, May.
  2. Kiridaran Kanagaretnam & Stuart Mestelman & S. M. Khalid Nainar & Mohamed Shehata, 2012. "Trust and Reciprocity, Empowerment and Transparency," Department of Economics Working Papers 2012-12, McMaster University.
  3. Jim Engle-Warnick & Andreas Leibbrandt, 2006. "Who Gets The Last Word? An Experimental Study Of The Effect Of A Peer Review Process On The Expression Of Social Norms," Departmental Working Papers, McGill University, Department of Economics 2006-11, McGill University, Department of Economics.
  4. Mary Rigdon, 2005. "Trust and Reciprocity in Incentive Contracting," Experimental, EconWPA 0511007, EconWPA.
  5. Maroš Servátka & Steven Tucker & Radovan Vadovic, 2008. "Words Speak Louder Than Money," Working Papers in Economics, University of Canterbury, Department of Economics and Finance 08/18, University of Canterbury, Department of Economics and Finance.
  6. Antoine Billot & Chantal Marlats, 2009. "Préferences psychologiques et nouvelle économie politique," PSE Working Papers halshs-00566146, HAL.
  7. Sophie Clot & Charlotte Stanton, 2014. "Present Bias in Payments for Ecosystem Services: Insights from a Behavioural Experiment in Uganda," Working Papers, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier 14-03, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Jan 2014.
  8. Maroš Servátka & Steven Tucker & Radovan Vadovič, 2011. "Building Trust—One Gift at a Time," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 2(4), pages 412-433, September.
  9. Cassar, Alessandra & Friedman, Daniel & Schneider, Patricia Higino, 2009. "Cheating in markets: A laboratory experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 240-259, October.
  10. Belot, Michèle & Bhaskar, V. & van de Ven, Jeroen, 2010. "Promises and cooperation: Evidence from a TV game show," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 73(3), pages 396-405, March.

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