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Préferences psychologiques et nouvelle économie politique

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  • Antoine Billot

    (UP9 - Université Paris 9, Dauphine - Université Paris IX - Paris Dauphine, PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - CNRS : UMR8545 - École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) - École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC) - École normale supérieure [ENS] - Paris, EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris)

  • Chantal Marlats

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Paris I - Panthéon-Sorbonne)

Abstract

First, we present what is called the Theory of Psychological Preferences (altruism, rational reciprocity...) through, on one side, the list of axioms proposed by Sandbu (2008) for pure individual decisions and, on the other side, that of Segal and Sobel (2007) for strategical ones. Second, we characterize the potential relevance of such a theory to define a new "politicial economy" approach and we search to define the precise scope of this field of investigation in combining the micro'demands of the psychological preference theory with the standard macro'ones. Finally, we show that polycentered models seem to be the only framework within which individual psychological preference is an appropriate tool to study the collective impact of altruism, social loyalty, intrinsic reciprocity and so forth .

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by HAL in its series PSE Working Papers with number halshs-00566146.

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Date of creation: Feb 2009
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Handle: RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-00566146

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Related research

Keywords: preference ; altruism ; behavior;

References

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  1. Uzi Segal & Joel Sobel, 2008. "A characterization of intrinsic reciprocity," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 36(3), pages 571-585, March.
  2. Falk, Armin & Fischbacher, Urs, 2006. "A theory of reciprocity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 293-315, February.
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  4. Georg Kirchsteiger & Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, 1997. "Reciprocity as a contract enforcement device: experimental evidence," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/5911, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
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  14. Margin Dufwenberg & Georg Kirchsteiger, 2001. "A Theory of Sequential Reciprocity," Levine's Working Paper Archive 563824000000000090, David K. Levine.
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  19. Tversky, Amos & Kahneman, Daniel, 1991. "Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent Model," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 106(4), pages 1039-61, November.
  20. Kahneman, Daniel & Knetsch, Jack L & Thaler, Richard H, 1986. "Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(4), pages S285-300, October.
  21. Jean-Pierre Dupuy, 1989. "Convention et Common knowledge," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 40(2), pages 361-400.
  22. Munro, Alistair & Sugden, Robert, 2003. "On the theory of reference-dependent preferences," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 50(4), pages 407-428, April.
  23. Paul Heidhues & Frank Riedel, 2007. "Do social preferences matter in competitive markets?," Working Papers 392, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
  24. Douglas D. Davis & Charles A. Holt, 1994. "Market Power and Mergers in Laboratory Markets with Posted Prices," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(3), pages 467-487, Autumn.
  25. Urs Fischbacher & Simon Gaechter & Ernst Fehr, . "Are People Conditionally Cooperative? Evidence from a Public Goods Experiment," IEW - Working Papers 016, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  26. Vernon L. Smith, 1962. "An Experimental Study of Competitive Market Behavior," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 70, pages 111.
  27. Axel Ockenfels & Gary E. Bolton, 2000. "ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 166-193, March.
  28. Segal, Uzi & Sobel, Joel, 1999. "Tit for Tat: Foundations of Preferences for Reciprocity in Strategic Settings," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt9xf8836g, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
  29. Geanakoplos, John & Pearce, David & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1989. "Psychological games and sequential rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 60-79, March.
  30. Frey, Bruno S & Oberholzer-Gee, Felix, 1997. "The Cost of Price Incentives: An Empirical Analysis of Motivation Crowding-Out," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(4), pages 746-55, September.
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