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Implementation under strong equilibrium : A complete characterization

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  • Dutta, Bhaskar
  • Sen, Arunava

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Mathematical Economics.

Volume (Year): 20 (1991)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 49-67

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Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:20:y:1991:i:1:p:49-67

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jmateco

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Cited by:
  1. Murat R. Sertel & M. Remzi Sanver, 2004. "Strong equilibrium outcomes of voting games ¶are the generalized Condorcet winners," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 331-347, 04.
  2. Eric Maskin & Tomas Sjostrom, 2001. "Implementation Theory," Economics Working Papers, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science 0006, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
  3. Sang-Chul Suh, 1996. "An algorithm for checking strong Nash implementability," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 109-122.
  4. Luis C. Corchon, 2007. "The theory of implementation : what did we learn?," Economics Working Papers, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía we081207, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
  5. Korpela, Ville, 2013. "A simple sufficient condition for strong implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 2183-2193.
  6. Brusco, Sandro, 1997. "Implementing Action Profiles when Agents Collude," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 395-424, April.
  7. Matthew O. Jackson & Sanjay Srivastava, 1992. "Characterizations of Game Theoretic Solutions which Lead to Impossibility Theorems," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1004, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  8. Bezalel Peleg & Ariel D. Procaccia, 2007. "Implementation by Mediated Equilibrium," Discussion Paper Series, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem dp463, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  9. Ermolov, Andrew N., 1995. "Coalitional manipulation in a quasilinear economy," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 349-363.
  10. Wako, Jun, 2005. "Coalition-proof Nash allocation in a barter game with multiple indivisible goods," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 179-199, March.
  11. Eric S. Maskin, 2008. "Mechanism Design: How to Implement Social Goals," Economics Working Papers, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science 0081, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
  12. Shin, Sungwhee & Suh, Sang-Chul, 1996. "A mechanism implementing the stable rule in marriage problems," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 185-189, May.
  13. Suh, Sang-Chul, 1996. "Implementation with coalition formation: A complete characterization," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 409-428.
  14. Suh, Sang-Chul, 2001. "An algorithm for verifying double implementability in Nash and strong Nash equilibria," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 103-110, January.
  15. Luis Corchon & Simon Wilkie, 1996. "Double implementation of the ratio correspondence by a market mechanism," Review of Economic Design, Springer, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 325-337, December.
  16. Yi, Jianxin, 2012. "Double implementation in Nash and M-Nash equilibria," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 116(1), pages 105-107.
  17. Saijo, Tatsuyoshi & Tatamitani, Yoshikatsu & Yamato, Takehiko, 1996. "Toward Natural Implementation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 37(4), pages 949-80, November.

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