Implementation under strong equilibrium : A complete characterization
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Mathematical Economics.
Volume (Year): 20 (1991)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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- Maskin, Eric S., 2007.
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- Brusco, Sandro, 1997. "Implementing Action Profiles when Agents Collude," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 395-424, April.
- Matthew O. Jackson & Sanjay Srivastava, 1992. "Characterizations of Game Theoretic Solutions which Lead to Impossibility Theorems," Discussion Papers 1004, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Ermolov, Andrew N., 1995. "Coalitional manipulation in a quasilinear economy," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 349-363.
- Murat R. Sertel & M. Remzi Sanver, 2004.
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- Murat R. Sertel & Remzi Sanver, 2001. "Strong Equilibrium Outcomes of Voting Games are the Generalized Condorcet Winners," Departmental Working Papers 0107, Bilkent University, Department of Economics.
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