1. Segal, Ilya, 1999. "Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 66(1), pages 57-82, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Nabil J Al-Najjar & Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, 2002. "Unforeseen Contingencies," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 431, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Al-Najjar, Nabil I. & Anderlini, Luca & Felli, Leonardo, 2002. "Unforeseen Contingencies," CEPR Discussion Papers 3271, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Nabil I. Al-Najjar & Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, 2003. "Undescribable Events," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Nabil I. Al-Najjar & Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, 2006. "Undescribable Events," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 73(4), pages 849-868, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Bernheim, B Douglas & Whinston, Michael D, 1998. "Incomplete Contracts and Strategic Ambiguity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 902-32, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1997. "Incomplete Contracts and Strategic Ambiguity," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1787, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
5. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 1998. "Power In A Theory Of The Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 113(2), pages 387-432, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Rajan, Raghuram G & Zingales, Luigi, 1998. "Power in a Theory of the Firm," CEPR Discussion Papers 1777, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, . "Power in a Theory of the Firm," CRSP working papers 335, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
   • Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 1997. "Power in a Theory of the Firm," NBER Working Papers 6274, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1997. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 1-29, February.
   Other versions:
   • Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1994. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," IDEI Working Papers 37, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
   • Philippe Aghion & Jean Tirole, 1994. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," Working papers 95-8, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
   • Philippe Aghion & Jean Tirole, 1994. "Normal and Real Authority in Organizations," Working papers 94-13, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
7. Dekel, Eddie & Lipman, Barton L. & Rustichini, Aldo, 1998. "Recent developments in modeling unforeseen contingencies," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 523-542, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Alan Schwartz & Joel Watson, 2000. "Economic and Legal Aspects of Costly Recontracting," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 2000-05, Department of Economics, UC San Diego. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Joel C. Watson & Alan Schwartz, 2000. "Economic and Legal Aspects of Costly Recontracting," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm143, Yale School of Management. [Downloadable!]
9. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, 1999. "Economic Analysis of Law," NBER Working Papers 6960, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Kaplow, Louis & Shavell, Steven, 2002. "Economic analysis of law," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 25, pages 1661-1784 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver, 1985. "The Cost and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," CEPR Discussion Papers 70, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    • Oliver Hart & Sanford Grossman, 1985. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Working papers 372, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
11. Alan Schwartz, 2004. "The Law and Economics of Costly Contracting," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 20(1), pages 2-31, April.
    Other versions:
    • Alan Schwartz & Joel Watson, 2001. "The Law and Economics of Costly Contracting," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 2001-21, Department of Economics, UC San Diego. [Downloadable!]
    • Alan Schwartz & Joel Watson, . "The Law and Economics of Costly Contracting," Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy Working Paper Series yale_lepp-1004, Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy. [Downloadable!]
12. Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli, & Andrew Postlewaite, . "Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write?," Working Papers gueconwpa~03-03-29, Georgetown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite, 2006. "Should Courts always Enforce what Contracting Parties Write?," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    • Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite, 2009. "Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write?," PIER Working Paper Archive 09-004, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
    • Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite, 2003. "Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write?," PIER Working Paper Archive 03-026, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
    • Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite, . "Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write?," Working Papers gueconwpa~06-06-07, Georgetown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    • Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite, 2003. "Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write?," PIER Working Paper Archive 06-024, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Oct 2006. [Downloadable!]
    • Anderlini, Luca & Felli, Leonardo & Postlewaite, Andrew, 2004. "Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write?," CEPR Discussion Papers 4197, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
13. Jean Tirole, 1999. "Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(4), pages 741-782, July.

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

1. J. Luis Guasch & Jean-Jacques Laffont & Stephane Straub, 2004. "Renegotiation of Concession Contracts in Latin America," ESE Discussion Papers 103, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Guasch, J. Luis & Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Straub, Stephane, 2003. "Renegotiation of concession contracts in Latin America," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3011, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
2. Nabil Al-Najjar & Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, 2003. "Undescribable Contingencies," Discussion Papers 1370, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
3. Mitchell Berlin & Yaron Leitner, 2005. "Courts and contractual innovation: a preliminary analysis," Working Papers 05-27, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. [Downloadable!]
4. C. Manuel Willington, 2004. "Hold-Up under Costly Litigation and Imperfect Courts of Law," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 231, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • C. Manuel Willington, . "Hold-Up under Costly Litigation and Imperfect Courts of Law," ILADES-Georgetown University Working Papers inv144, Ilades-Georgetown University, School of Economics and Bussines. [Downloadable!]
5. Joel Watson, 2002. "Contract, Mechanism Design, and Technological Detail," Theory workshop papers 505798000000000006, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Joel Watson, 2002. "Contract, Mechanism Design, and Technological Detail," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 2002-04, Department of Economics, UC San Diego. [Downloadable!]
6. Chiara D'Alpaos & Michele Moretto & Paola Valbonesi, 2008. "Optimal penalty for investment delay in public procurement contracts," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0074, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno". [Downloadable!]
7. Steven Shavell, 2003. "On the Writing and the Interpretation of Contracts," NBER Working Papers 10094, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Joel Watson, 2006. "Contract, Mechanism Design, and Technological Detail," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 2002-04R, Department of Economics, UC San Diego. [Downloadable!]
9. Alan Schwartz & Joel Watson, . "The Law and Economics of Costly Contracting," Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy Working Paper Series yale_lepp-1004, Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Alan Schwartz & Joel Watson, 2001. "The Law and Economics of Costly Contracting," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 2001-21, Department of Economics, UC San Diego. [Downloadable!]
   • Alan Schwartz, 2004. "The Law and Economics of Costly Contracting," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 20(1), pages 2-31, April.
10. Dana Heller & Ran Spiegler, 2005. "Contradiction as a Form of Contractual Incompleteness," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000978, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
11. Neil A. Doherty & Alexander Muermann, 2005. "Insuring the Uninsurable: Brokers and Incomplete Insurance Contracts," CFS Working Paper Series 2005/24, Center for Financial Studies. [Downloadable!]
12. Anderlini, Luca & Felli, Leonardo & Postlewaite, Andrew, 2004. "Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write?," CEPR Discussion Papers 4197, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli, & Andrew Postlewaite, . "Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write?," Working Papers gueconwpa~03-03-29, Georgetown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    • Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite, 2006. "Should Courts always Enforce what Contracting Parties Write?," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    • Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite, 2009. "Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write?," PIER Working Paper Archive 09-004, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
    • Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite, 2003. "Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write?," PIER Working Paper Archive 03-026, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
    • Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite, . "Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write?," Working Papers gueconwpa~06-06-07, Georgetown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    • Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite, 2003. "Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write?," PIER Working Paper Archive 06-024, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Oct 2006. [Downloadable!]
13. Shurojit Chatterji & Dragan Filipovich, 2004. "Ambiguous Contracting: Natural Language and Judicial Interpretation," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 419, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
14. Etienne Pfister & Bruno Deffains & Myriam Doriat-Duban & Stéphane Saussier, 2006. "Institutions and contracts: Franchising," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 53-78, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
15. Giovanni Maggi & Robert W. Staiger, 2008. "On the Role and Design of Dispute Settlement Procedures in International Trade Agreements," NBER Working Papers 14067, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
16. Yaron Leitner, 2005. "Legal uncertainty and contractual innovation," Business Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, issue Q2, pages 26-32. [Downloadable!]
17. Iossa, Elisabetta & Jullien, Bruno, 2007. "The Market for Lawyers: The Value of Information on the Quality of Legal Services," IDEI Working Papers 485, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]