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Incentive issues in inter-firm relationships

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  • Baiman, Stanley
  • Rajan, Madhav V.
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Accounting, Organizations and Society.

    Volume (Year): 27 (2002)
    Issue (Month): 3 (April)
    Pages: 213-238

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:aosoci:v:27:y:2002:i:3:p:213-238

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    References

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    1. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 1998. "Power In A Theory Of The Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 113(2), pages 387-432, May.
    2. Riordan, Michael H., 1991. "Ownership without control: Toward a theory of backward integration," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 101-119, June.
    3. Malcomson, James M, 1986. "Rank-Order Contracts for a Principal with Many Agents," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(5), pages 807-17, October.
    4. Paul R. Milgrom., 1987. "Employment Contracts, Influence Activities and Efficient Organization Design," Economics Working Papers, University of California at Berkeley 8741, University of California at Berkeley.
    5. Aghion, Philippe & Dewatripont, Mathias & Rey, Patrick, 1994. "Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 62(2), pages 257-82, March.
    6. Jean Tirole, 1999. "Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 67(4), pages 741-782, July.
    7. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August.
    8. Demski, Joel S. & Sappington, David, 1984. "Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 152-171, June.
    9. Martimort, David, 1994. "Exclusive Dealing, Common Agency and Multiprincipals Incentive Theory," IDEI Working Papers, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse 43, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised 1996.
    10. Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1997. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," Scholarly Articles 4554125, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    11. Klein, Benjamin, 1996. "Why Hold-Ups Occur: The Self-Enforcing Range of Contractual Relationships," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, Western Economic Association International, vol. 34(3), pages 444-63, July.
    12. Boot, Arnoud W A & Greenbaum, Stuart I & Thakor, Anjan V, 1993. "Reputation and Discretion in Financial Contracting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1165-83, December.
    13. McAfee, R. Preston & McMillan, John., 1990. "Organizational Diseconomies of Scale," Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences 728, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
    14. Aaron S. Edlin & Stefan Reichelstein, 1995. "Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment," NBER Working Papers 5007, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Drago, Robert & Heywood, John S, 1989. "Tournaments, Piece Rates, and the Shape of the Payoff Function," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(4), pages 992-98, August.
    16. Vaysman, Igor, 1998. "A model of negotiated transfer pricing," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 349-384, June.
    17. Aghion, Philippe & Dewatripont, Mathias & Rey, Patrick, 1994. "Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information," Scholarly Articles 12375014, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    18. Oliver D. Hart, 1987. "Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm," Working papers 448, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    19. Banri Asanuma, 1985. "The Contractual Framework for Parts Supply in the Japanese Automotive Industry," Japanese Economy, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., vol. 13(4), pages 54-78, July.
    20. Ulrich, Karl, 1995. "The role of product architecture in the manufacturing firm," Research Policy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 419-440, May.
    21. Hart, Oliver D. & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Scholarly Articles 3448675, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    22. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1988. "Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts," Working papers 494, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    23. Prendergast, Canice, 1993. "The Role of Promotion in Inducing Specific Human Capital Acquisition," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 108(2), pages 523-34, May.
    24. Riordan, Michael H & Sappington, David E M, 1987. "Information, Incentives, and Organizational Mode," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 102(2), pages 243-63, May.
    25. Hart, Oliver, 1995. "Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, number 9780198288817, October.
    26. Melumad, Nahum & Mookherjee, Dilip & Reichelstein, Stefan, 1992. "A theory of responsibility centers," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 445-484, December.
    27. Lewis, Tracy R & Sappington, David E M, 1989. "Inflexible Rules in Incentive Problems," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 79(1), pages 69-84, March.
    28. Bernheim, B Douglas & Whinston, Michael D, 1998. "Incomplete Contracts and Strategic Ambiguity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 902-32, September.
    29. Joel S. Demski & David E.M. Sappington, 1991. "Resolving Double Moral Hazard Problems with Buyout Agreements," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(2), pages 232-240, Summer.
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    Cited by:
    1. Wouters, Marc & Anderson, James C. & Wynstra, Finn, 2005. "The adoption of total cost of ownership for sourcing decisions--a structural equations analysis," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 167-191, February.
    2. Ariela Caglio & Angelo Ditillo, 2012. "Interdependence and accounting information exchanges in inter-firm relationships," Journal of Management and Governance, Springer, Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 57-80, February.
    3. Van den Abbeele, Alexandra & Roodhooft, Filip & Warlop, Luk, 2009. "The effect of cost information on buyer-supplier negotiations in different power settings," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 245-266, February.
    4. Spekle, R.F. & van den Bogaard, M.A., 2002. "Reinventing The Hierarchy, The Case Of The Shell Chemicals Carve-Out," ERIM Report Series Research in Management, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasm ERS-2002-52-F&A, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus University Rotterdam.
    5. Suresh Radhakrishnan & Bin Srinidhi, 2005. "Sharing Demand Information in a Value Chain: Implications for Pricing and Profitability," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 23-45, January.
    6. Romano, Pietro & Formentini, Marco, 2012. "Designing and implementing open book accounting in buyer–supplier dyads: A framework for supplier selection and motivation," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 68-83.
    7. Caglio, Ariela & Ditillo, Angelo, 2008. "A review and discussion of management control in inter-firm relationships: Achievements and future directions," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 33(7-8), pages 865-898.

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