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Unforeseen contingencies

Author

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  • Al-Najjar, Nabil
  • Anderlini, Luca
  • Felli, Leonardo

Abstract

We develop a model of unforeseen contingencies. These are contingencies that are understood by economic agents – their consequences and probabilities are known – but are such that every description of such events necessarily leaves out relevant features that have a non-negligible impact on the parties' expected utilities. Using a simple co-insurance problem as a backdrop, we introduce a model where states are described in terms of objective features, and the description of an event specifies a finite number of such features. In this setting, unforeseen contingencies are present in the coinsurance problem when the first-best risk-sharing contract varies with the states of nature in a complex way that makes it highly sensitive to the component features of the states. In this environment, although agents can compute expected pay-offs, they are unable to include in any ex-ante agreement a description of the relevant contingencies that captures (even approximately) the relevant complexity of the risky environment.

Suggested Citation

  • Al-Najjar, Nabil & Anderlini, Luca & Felli, Leonardo, 2002. "Unforeseen contingencies," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 3578, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:3578
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    File URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/3578/
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Anderlini, Luca & Felli, Leonardo, 1998. "Describability and agency problems," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 35-59, January.
    2. Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, 1999. "Incomplete Contracts and Complexity Costs," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 46(1), pages 23-50, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Giovanni Maggi, 2002. "Rigidity, Discretion, and the Costs of Writing Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 798-817, September.
    2. Andrew Postlewaite, 2007. "Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 23(3), pages 662-684, October.
    3. Nabil I. Al-Najjar & Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, 2006. "Undescribable Events," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 73(4), pages 849-868.
    4. Guasch, J. Luis & Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Straub, Stephane, 2003. "Renegotiation of concession contracts in Latin America," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3011, The World Bank.
    5. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Giovanni Maggi, 2008. "Costly contracting in a long‐term relationship," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(2), pages 352-377, June.
    6. Guasch, J. Luis & Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Straub, Stéphane, 2008. "Renegotiation of concession contracts in Latin America: Evidence from the water and transport sectors," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 421-442, March.
    7. Patrick Bolton & Antoine Faure-Grimaud, 2010. "Satisficing Contracts," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 77(3), pages 937-971.
    8. Cesare Dosi & Michele Moretto, 2015. "Procurement with Unenforceable Contract Time and the Law of Liquidated Damages," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 31(1), pages 160-186.
    9. Jorge Montesinos & Eduardo Saavedra, 2012. "Algunos Alcances en torno a la Institucionalidad y Renegociación de Concesiones en la Infraestructura de Transporte de Uso Público en Perú," ILADES-UAH Working Papers inv277, Universidad Alberto Hurtado/School of Economics and Business.
    10. Nabil Al-Najjar & Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, 2003. "Undescribable Contingencies," Discussion Papers 1370, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    11. J. Luis Guasch, 2004. "Granting and Renegotiating Infrastructure Concessions : Doing it Right," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 15024, December.
    12. Paul Schweinzer, 2001. "Bilateral Uncertainty in a Model of Job-Market Screening with Intermediaries," Game Theory and Information 0108002, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 08 Jan 2002.
    13. Giovanni Maggi & Robert W. Staiger, 2008. "On the Role and Design of Dispute Settlement Procedures in International Trade Agreements," NBER Working Papers 14067, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Unforeseen contingencies; incomplete contracts; finite invariance; fine variability;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C69 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Other
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • D89 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Other

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