In international trade policy, the concept of market access is pivotal. Yet, it remains a neglected category in institutional-economics approaches to international trade. The paper introduces a new analytical category, which relates explicitly to the exchange of market access among governments: market access rights (MARs). Tariffs, quotas, standards, border controls, etc. are all treated as specific institutional forms of MARs. Major aspects of the international trade system can be explained as evolving institutional solutions to problems in transacting MARs, such as the most favored nation (MFN) clause as a mechanism to internalize externalities, and the rules governing safeguards and retaliation as procedures of continuous renegotiation of MARs with changing value.
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Volume (Year): 164 (2008) Issue (Month): 2 (June) Pages: 302-326 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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