1. Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjostrom, 1996. "Interactive Implementation," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1751, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
   Other versions:
   • Baliga, Sandeep & Sjostrom, Tomas, 1999. "Interactive Implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 38-63, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Robert Shimer & Lones Smith, 2000. "Assortative Matching and Search," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(2), pages 343-370, March.
   Other versions:
   • Shimer, R. & Smith, L., 1997. "Assortative Matching and Search," Working papers 97-2a, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
   • Shimer, R. & Smith, L., 1997. "Assortative Matching and Search," Working papers 97-2b, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
   • Shimer, R. & Smith, L., 1998. "Assortive Matching and Search," Papers 98-09, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
3. Kalai, Ehud & Ledyard, John O., 1998. "Repeated Implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 308-317, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Ehud Kalai & John O. Ledyard, 1997. "Repeated Implementation," Discussion Papers 1205, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
   • Kalai, Ehud & Ledyard, John, 1997. "Repeated Implementation," Working Papers 1027, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
4. Jackson, Matthew O, 1992. "Implementation in Undominated.Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 59(4), pages 757-75, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Matthew 0. Jackson, 1989. "Implementation in Undominated Strategies - A Look at Bounded Mechanisms," Discussion Papers 833, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
5. Feldman, Mark & Gilles, Christian, 1985. "An expository note on individual risk without aggregate uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 26-32, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Ma, Ching-to & Moore, John & Turnbull, Stephen, 1988. "Stopping agents from "cheating"," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 355-372, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Nabil Al-Najjar, 1996. "Aggregation and the Law of Large Numbers in Economies with a Continuum of Agents," Discussion Papers 1160, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
8. Bhaskar Dutta & Arunava Sen & Rajiv Vohra, 1994. "Nash implementation through elementary mechanisms in economic environments," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 173-203, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. Baliga, Sandeep & Corchon, Luis C. & Sjostrom, Tomas, 1997. "The Theory of Implementation When the Planner Is a Player," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 15-33, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Luis Corchón & Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjöström, 1995. "The Theory Of Implementation When The Planner Is A Player," Working Papers. Serie AD 1995-14, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
   • Baliga, S. & Corchon, L.C. & Sjostrom, T., 1995. "The Theory of Implemetation when the Planner is a PLayer," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 9512, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
10. Judd, Kenneth L., 1985. "The law of large numbers with a continuum of IID random variables," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 19-25, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
11. Dale T. Mortensen, 1982. "The Matching Process as a Noncooperative Bargaining Game," NBER Chapters, in: The Economics of Information and Uncertainty, pages 233-258 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!]
12. Gale, Douglas M, 1986. "Bargaining and Competition Part II: Existence," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(4), pages 807-18, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
13. Rubinstein, Ariel & Wolinsky, Asher, 1985. "Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(5), pages 1133-50, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
14. Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1989. "Renegotiation-Proof Implementation and Time Preferences," Discussion Papers 850, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1990. "Renegotiation-Proof Implementation and Time Preferences," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 215, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
    • Rubinstein, Ariel & Wolinsky, Asher, 1992. "Renegotiation-Proof Implementation and Time Preferences," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(3), pages 600-614, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
15. McLennan, Andrew & Sonnenschein, Hugo, 1991. "Sequential Bargaining as a Noncooperative Foundation for Walrasian Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(5), pages 1395-1424, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
16. Hosios, Arthur J, 1990. "On the Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and Unemployment," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 57(2), pages 279-98, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
17. Jackson Matthew O. & Palfrey Thomas R. & Srivastava Sanjay, 1994. "Undominated Nash Implementation in Bounded Mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 474-501, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Matthew, Jackson O. & Palfrey, Thomas R. & Srivastava, Sanjay., 1990. "Undominated Nash Implementation in Bounded Mechanism," Working Papers 754, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
    • Matthew O. Jackson, 1990. "Undominated Nash Implementation in Bounded Mechanisms," Discussion Papers 966, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
18. Sakovics, J. & Ponsati, C., 1995. "Rubinstein Batgaining with Tow-Sided Options," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 318.95, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
19. Dale T. Mortensen, 1979. "The Matching Process as a Non-Cooperative/Bargaining Game," Discussion Papers 384, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
20. Sattinger, Michael, 1995. "Search and the Efficient Assignment of Workers to Jobs," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 36(2), pages 283-302, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
21. JoseHerrero, Maria & Srivastava, Sanjay, 1992. "Implementation via backward induction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 70-88, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
22. Hart, Oliver D & Moore, John, 1988. "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(4), pages 755-85, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Hardman Moore, John & Hart, Oliver, 1985. "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation," CEPR Discussion Papers 60, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    • Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1985. "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation," Working papers 367, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
23. Gretsky, Neil E & Ostroy, Joseph M & Zame, William R, 1992. "The Nonatomic Assignment Model," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 103-27, January.
    Other versions:
    • Neil E. Gretsky & Joseph M. Ostroy & William R. Zame, 1990. "The Nonatomic Assignment Model," UCLA Economics Working Papers 605, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
24. Saijo, T. & Tatamitani, Y. & Yamato, T., 1994. "Toward Natural Implementation," Papers 340, Osaka - Institute of Social and Economic Research.
    Other versions:
    • Saijo, Tatsuyoshi & Tatamitani, Yoshikatsu & Yamato, Takehiko, 1996. "Toward Natural Implementation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 37(4), pages 949-80, November.
25. Abreu, Dilip & Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1992. "Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(5), pages 993-1008, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Abreu, D. & Matsushima, H., 1991. "Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Incomplete Information," Papers e-91-2, Stanford - Hoover Institution.
    • Abreu, D. & Matsushima, H., 1991. "Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Incomplete Information," Papers e-91-1, Stanford - Hoover Institution.
26. Chakravorti, B. & Corchon, L.C., 1992. "Credible Implementation," Papers 76, Bell Communications - Economic Research Group.
    Other versions:
    • Luis Corchón & Bhaskar Chakravorti & Simon Wilkie, 1993. "Credible Implementation," Working Papers. Serie AD 1993-02, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
    • Chakravorty, Bhaskar & Corchon, Luis C. & Wilkie, Simon, 2006. "Credible implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 18-36, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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1. Sandro Brusco & Matthew O. Jackson, 1997. "The Optimal Design of a Market," Microeconomics 9711003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Matthew O. Jackson & Sandro Brusco, 1997. "The Optimal Design of a Market," Discussion Papers 1186, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
   • Brusco, Sandro & Jackson, Matthew O., 1999. "The Optimal Design of a Market," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 1-39, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Damiano, Ettore & Li, Hao & Suen, Wing, 2004. "Unraveling of Dynamic Sorting," Micro Theory Working Papers damiano-04-08-11-03-02-02, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 11 Aug 2004. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Ettore Damiano & Hao Li, 2004. "Unraveling of Dynamic Sorting," 2004 Meeting Papers 174, Society for Economic Dynamics. [Downloadable!]
   • Ettore Damiano & Hao Li, 2004. "Unraveling of Dynamic Sorting," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 72, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
   • Ettore Damiano, 2005. "Unravelling of Dynamic Sorting," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 72(4), pages 1057-1076, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Pablo Amorós, 2003. "Nash Implementation and Uncertain Renegotiation," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2003/27, Centro de Estudios Andaluces. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Amoros, Pablo, 2004. "Nash implementation and uncertain renegotiation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 424-434, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Nadia Burani, 2008. "Matching, search and intermediation with two-sided heterogeneity," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 75-117, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)