Social games: Matching and the play of finitely repeated games
AbstractWe examine a new class of games, which we call social games, such that players not only choose strategies but also choose with whom they play. A group of players who are dissatisfied with the play of their current partners can join together and play a new equilibrium. This imposes new refinements on equilibrium play in games, and we show how play depends on the relative populations of players in different roles, among other things. We also introduce finitely repeated social games where players may choose to rematch in any period. Some equilibria of fixed-player finitely repeated games cannot be sustained as equilibria in a finitely repeated social game. Conversely, the set of repeated matching equilibria includes some plays that are not part of any subgame perfect equilibrium of the corresponding fixed-player repeated games. We explore existence of finitely repeated matching equilibria, the relationship to renegotiation-proof equilibrium, and show how new predictions are made in trust and centipede games.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.
Volume (Year): 70 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (September)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836
Social games Matching Games Repeated games Renegotiation;
Other versions of this item:
- Matthew O. Jackson & Alison Watts, 2005. "Social Games: Matching and the Play of Finitely Repeated Games," Working Papers 2005.38, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Jackson, Matthew O. & Watts, Alison, 2005. "Social Games: Matching and the play of finitely repeated games," Working Papers 1212, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Matthew O. Jackson & Alison Watts, 2005. "Social Games: Matching and the Play of Finitely Repeated Games," Game Theory and Information 0503003, EconWPA.
- A14 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Sociology of Economics
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
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