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Long-term relationships as safeguards

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  • Rafael Rob

    ()

  • Huanxing Yang

    ()

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00199-008-0421-1
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 43 (2010)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Pages: 143-166

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Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:43:y:2010:i:2:p:143-166

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Related research

Keywords: Community games; Information flows; Heterogeneity of types; Long-term relationships; C73; C78; D82;

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References

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  1. Kranton, Rachel E, 1996. "The Formation of Cooperative Relationships," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 12(1), pages 214-33, April.
  2. Avinash Dixit, 2003. "On Modes of Economic Governance," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 71(2), pages 449-481, March.
  3. Simon Johnson & John McMillan, 2002. "Courts and Relational Contracts," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 18(1), pages 221-277, April.
  4. Kali, Raja, 1999. "Endogenous Business Networks," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(3), pages 615-36, October.
  5. Watson, Joel, 2002. "Starting Small and Commitment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 176-199, January.
  6. Rafael Rob & Huanxing Yang, 2010. "Long-term relationships as safeguards," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 43(2), pages 143-166, May.
  7. Kandori, Michihiro, 1992. "Social Norms and Community Enforcement," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(1), pages 63-80, January.
  8. Ghosh, Parikshit & Ray, Debraj, 1996. "Cooperation in Community Interaction without Information Flows," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(3), pages 491-519, July.
  9. P. Diamond, 1980. "Aggregate Demand Management in Search Equilibrium," Working papers 268, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  10. Watson, Joel, 1999. "Starting Small and Renegotiation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 52-90, March.
  11. Jan Eeckhout, 2006. "Minorities and Endogenous Segregation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 73(1), pages 31-53.
  12. Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 533-54, May.
  13. Joel Sobel, 2006. "For Better or Forever: Formal versus Informal Enforcement," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(2), pages 271-298, April.
  14. Ellison, Glenn, 1994. "Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(3), pages 567-88, July.
  15. Taylor, Curtis R, 2000. "The Old-Boy Network and the Young-Gun Effect," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 41(4), pages 871-91, November.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Steffen Huck & Gabriele K. Ruchala & Jean-Robert Tyran, 2006. "Competition Fosters Trust," Discussion Papers 06-22, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  2. Matthew O. Jackson & Alison Watts, 2005. "Social Games: Matching and the Play of Finitely Repeated Games," Working Papers 2005.38, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  3. Rafael Rob & Huanxing Yang, 2010. "Long-term relationships as safeguards," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 43(2), pages 143-166, May.
  4. David McAdams, 2011. "Performance and Turnover in a Stochastic Partnership," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 3(4), pages 107-42, November.
  5. Frédéric Schneider & Roberto A. Weber, 2013. "Long-term commitment and cooperation," ECON - Working Papers, Department of Economics - University of Zurich 130, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
  6. Takako Fujiwara-Greve & Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara, 2008. "Voluntarily Separable Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-599, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  7. Furusawa, Taiji & Kawakami, Toshikazu, 2008. "Gradual cooperation in the existence of outside options," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 378-389, November.
  8. Conley, John P. & Neilson, William S., 2013. "Endogenous coordination and discoordination games: Multiculturalism and assimilation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 176-191.
  9. Filip Vesely & Chun-Lei Yang, 2013. "On Optimal Social Convention in Voluntary Continuation Prisoner's Dilemma Games," CESifo Working Paper Series 4553, CESifo Group Munich.
  10. Engseld, Peter & Bergh, Andreas, 2005. "Choosing Opponents in Prisoners' Dilemma: An Evolutionary Analysis," Working Papers 2005:45, Lund University, Department of Economics.
  11. Takako Fujiwara-Greve & Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara, 2006. "Voluntarily Separable Prisoner's Dilemma," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-415, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  12. Takako Fujiwara-Greve & Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara & Nobue Suzuki, 2010. "Voluntarily Separable Repeated Games with Social Norms," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-715, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.

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