Equilibrium Existence in Bipartite Social Games: A Generalization of Stable Matchings
AbstractWe prove existence of equilibria in bipartite social games, where players choose both a strategy in a game and a partner with whom to play the game. Such social games generalize the well-known marriage problem where players choose partners but do not take actions subsequent to matching.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by AccessEcon in its journal Economics Bulletin.
Volume (Year): 3 (2008)
Issue (Month): 12 ()
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