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Auctions, Matching and the Law of Aggregate Demand

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  • John W. Hatfield
  • Paul Milgrom

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Levine's Bibliography with number 122247000000000780.

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Date of creation: 04 Jan 2005
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000780

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  1. Brewer, Paul J. & Plott, Charles R., 1996. "A binary conflict ascending price (BICAP) mechanism for the decentralized allocation of the right to use railroad tracks," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 14(6), pages 857-886, October.
  2. Milgrom,Paul, 2004. "Putting Auction Theory to Work," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521551847.
  3. Roth, Alvin E. & Sotomayor, Marilda, 1992. "Two-sided matching," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 16, pages 485-541 Elsevier.
  4. Elliott Peranson & Alvin E. Roth, 1999. "The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 748-780, September.
  5. Paul R. Milgrom, 1985. "Auction Theory," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 779, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  6. Martinez, Ruth & Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro & Oviedo, Jorge, 2000. "Single Agents and the Set of Many-to-One Stable Matchings," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 91(1), pages 91-105, March.
  7. Roth, Alvin E, 1991. "A Natural Experiment in the Organization of Entry-Level Labor Markets: Regional Markets for New Physicians and Surgeons in the United Kingdom," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 81(3), pages 415-40, June.
  8. Paul Milgrom, . "Putting Auction Theory to Work: The Simultaneous Ascending Auction," Working Papers, Stanford University, Department of Economics 98002, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
  9. Demange, Gabrielle & Gale, David, 1985. "The Strategy Structure of Two-sided Matching Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 53(4), pages 873-88, July.
  10. Gul, Faruk & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1999. "Walrasian Equilibrium with Gross Substitutes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 95-124, July.
  11. Alkan, Ahmet & Gale, David, 2003. "Stable schedule matching under revealed preference," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 112(2), pages 289-306, October.
  12. Roth, Alvin E, 1986. "On the Allocation of Residents to Rural Hospitals: A General Property of Two-Sided Matching Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 54(2), pages 425-27, March.
  13. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Paul Milgrom, 2002. "Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding," Working Papers, Stanford University, Department of Economics 02004, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
  14. Blum, Yosef & Roth, Alvin E. & Rothblum, Uriel G., 1997. "Vacancy Chains and Equilibration in Senior-Level Labor Markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 362-411, October.
  15. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tayfun Smez, 2003. "School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach," Discussion Papers, Columbia University, Department of Economics 0203-18, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
  16. Roth, Alvin E., 1985. "The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 277-288, August.
  17. Jeremy Bulow & Jonathan Levin, 2006. "Matching and Price Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 652-668, June.
  18. Roth, Alvin E, 1984. "Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 47-57, January.
  19. Kelso, Alexander S, Jr & Crawford, Vincent P, 1982. "Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1483-1504, November.
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Cited by:
  1. Claus-Jochen Haake & Bettina Klaus, 2009. "Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 41(3), pages 393-410, December.
  2. Jackson, Matthew O. & Watts, Alison, 2010. "Social games: Matching and the play of finitely repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 170-191, September.
  3. Hideo Konishi & Utku Unver, 2004. "Credible Group Stability in Multi-Partner Matching Problems," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 32, Econometric Society.
  4. Hiroki Saitoh & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2008. "Vickrey allocation rule with income effect," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 35(2), pages 391-401, May.
  5. Ilya Segal, 2004. "The Communication Requirements of of Social Choice Rules and Supporting Budget Sets," Economics Working Papers, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science 0039, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
  6. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Paul Milgrom, 2005. "Ascending Proxy Auctions," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000785, UCLA Department of Economics.
  7. Benjamin Edelman & Michael Ostrovsky & Michael Schwarz, 2007. "Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second-Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 242-259, March.

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