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Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords

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  • Unknown, 2005. "Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt8w16v26k, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
    • Handle: RePEc:cdl:econwp:qt8w16v26k
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    1. Crawford, Vincent P & Knoer, Elsie Marie, 1981. "Job Matching with Heterogeneous Firms and Workers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(2), pages 437-450, March.
    2. Ken Binmore & Paul Klemperer, 2002. "The Biggest Auction Ever: the Sale of the British 3G Telecom Licences," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(478), pages 74-96, March.
    3. Robert Wilson, 2002. "Architecture of Power Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(4), pages 1299-1340, July.
    4. Demange, Gabrielle & Gale, David & Sotomayor, Marilda, 1986. "Multi-Item Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 863-872, August.
    5. Roth, Alvin E, 1984. "The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(6), pages 991-1016, December.
    6. John W. Hatfield & Paul Milgrom, 2005. "Auctions, Matching and the Law of Aggregate Demand," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000780, UCLA Department of Economics.
    7. Paul Milgrom, 2000. "Putting Auction Theory to Work: The Simultaneous Ascending Auction," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(2), pages 245-272, April.
    8. Kagel, John H & Harstad, Ronald M & Levin, Dan, 1987. "Information Impact and Allocation Rules in Auctions with Affiliated Private Values: A Laboratory Study," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(6), pages 1275-1304, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ning Chen & Xiaotie Deng & Paul W. Goldberg & Jinshan Zhang, 2016. "On revenue maximization with sharp multi-unit demands," Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Springer, vol. 31(3), pages 1174-1205, April.
    2. Yongmin Chen & Chuan He, 2011. "Paid Placement: Advertising and Search on the Internet," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 121(556), pages 309-328, November.
    3. D Laffey & C Hunka & J A Sharp & Z Zeng, 2009. "Estimating advertisers' values for paid search clickthroughs," Journal of the Operational Research Society, Palgrave Macmillan;The OR Society, vol. 60(3), pages 411-418, March.
    4. Evgenia Christoforou & Antonio Fernández Anta & Agustín Santos, 2016. "A Mechanism for Fair Distribution of Resources without Payments," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 11(5), pages 1-20, May.
    5. Mueller-Frank, Manuel & M. Pai, Mallesh, 2015. "Do Online Social Networks Increase Welfare?," IESE Research Papers D/1118, IESE Business School.
    6. Axel Ockenfels & David Reiley & Abdolkarim Sadrieh, 2006. "Online Auctions," NBER Working Papers 12785, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Arash Asadpour & MohammadHossein Bateni & Kshipra Bhawalkar & Vahab Mirrokni, 2019. "Concise Bid Optimization Strategies with Multiple Budget Constraints," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(12), pages 5785-5812, December.
    8. Feldman, Michal & Fu, Hu & Gravin, Nick & Lucier, Brendan, 2020. "Simultaneous auctions without complements are (almost) efficient," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 327-341.
    9. Snehalkumar & S. Gaikwad & Durim Morina & Adam Ginzberg & Catherine Mullings & Shirish Goyal & Dilrukshi Gamage & Christopher Diemert & Mathias Burton & Sharon Zhou & Mark Whiting & Karolina Ziulkoski, 2019. "Boomerang: Rebounding the Consequences of Reputation Feedback on Crowdsourcing Platforms," Papers 1904.06722, arXiv.org.

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