Decentralized dynamics and equitable core selection in assignment games
AbstractWe study decentralized assignment games where many agents interact anonymously at virtually no cost.� Very little information is available and trade takes place at many different prices simultaneously.� We propose a completely uncoupled learning process that leads to equitable core outcomes characterized by the least core.� Agents randomly encounter other agents, make bids and offers for potential partnerships and match if the partnerships are profitable.� This process leads to equitable core allocations even though agents have no knowledge of other agents' strategies, payoffs, or the structure of the game, and there is no central authority with such knowledge either.� Equity is favored because it is more stable, not because of any ex ante fairness criterion.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number 607.
Date of creation: 01 Jun 2012
Date of revision:
Assignment games; cooperative games; core; equity; evolutionary game theory; learning; matching markets; stochastic stability;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
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