Conflict Leads to Cooperation in Nash Bargaining
AbstractWe consider a Nash demand game where N players come to the bargaining table with requests for coalition partners and a potentially generated resource. We show that group learning leads to complete cooperation and an interior core allocation with probability one. Our arguments highlight group dynamics and demonstrate how destructive group behaviors--exclusion, divide and conquer tactics, and scapegoating--can propel groups toward beneficial and self-enforcing cooperation.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Yale University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 39.
Date of creation: Mar 2008
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Kareen Rozen, 2008. "Conflict Leads to Cooperation in Nash Bargaining," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002086, David K. Levine.
- Kareen Rozen, 2008. "Conflict Leads to Cooperation in Nash Bargaining," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1641, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jun 2009.
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-02-07 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2009-02-07 (Game Theory)
- NEP-SOC-2009-02-07 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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