Conflict Leads to Cooperation in Nash Bargaining

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Conflict Leads to Cooperation in Nash Bargaining

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Rozen, Kareen (Yale U)

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Kareen Rozen

Abstract

We consider a Nash demand game where N players come to the bargaining table with requests for coalition partners and a potentially generated resource. We show that group learning leads to complete cooperation and an interior core allocation with probability one. Our arguments highlight group dynamics and demonstrate how destructive group behaviors--exclusion, divide and conquer tactics, and scapegoating--can propel groups toward beneficial and self-enforcing cooperation.

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Paper provided by Yale University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 39.

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Date of creation: Mar 2008
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Handle: RePEc:ecl:yaleco:39

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Paper
- Kareen Rozen, 2008. "Conflict Leads to Cooperation in Nash Bargaining," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000002086, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Kareen Rozen, 2008. "Conflict Leads to Cooperation in Nash Bargaining," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1641, Cowles Foundation, Yale University, revised Jun 2009. [Downloadable!]

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2009-02-07 (All new papers)
NEP-GTH-2009-02-07 (Game Theory)
NEP-SOC-2009-02-07 (Social Norms & Social Capital)

References listed on IDEAS
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Perry, Motty & Reny, Philip J, 1994. "A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 795-817, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Perry, M. & Rany, P., 1992. "A Non-Cooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 9203, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
Arnold, Tone & Schwalbe, Ulrich, 2002. "Dynamic coalition formation and the core," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 363-380, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Chatterjee, Kalyan & Bhaskar Dutta & Debraj Ray & Kunal Sengupta, 1993. "A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 60(2), pages 463-77, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Agastya, Murali, 1997. "Adaptive Play in Multiplayer Bargaining Situations," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 64(3), pages 411-26, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Murali Agastia, . "Adaptive Play in Multiplayer Bargaining Situations," ELSE working papers 007, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution. [Downloadable!]
Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993. "Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Kandori, M. & Mailath, G.J., 1991. "Learning, Mutation, And Long Run Equilibria In Games," Papers 71, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - John M. Olin Program.
Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Konishi, Hideo & Ray, Debraj, 2003. "Coalition formation as a dynamic process," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 110(1), pages 1-41, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Hideo Konishi & Debraj Ray, 2000. "Coalition Formation as a Dynamic Process," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 478, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 15 Apr 2002. [Downloadable!]
Young H. P., 1993. "An Evolutionary Model of Bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 145-168, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Agastya, Murali, 1999. "Perturbed Adaptive Dynamics in Coalition Form Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 89(2), pages 207-233, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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