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Perturbed Adaptive Dynamics in Coalition Form Games

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  • Agastya, Murali

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WJ3-45FKNWP-3/2/dcdbbfc032a94c6c8cd6369284aff57a
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 89 (1999)
Issue (Month): 2 (December)
Pages: 207-233

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:89:y:1999:i:2:p:207-233

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

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References

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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  1. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
  2. Murali Agastia, . "Adaptive Play in Multiplayer Bargaining Situations," ELSE working papers 007, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
  3. Young H. P., 1993. "An Evolutionary Model of Bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 145-168, February.
  4. Aumann, Robert J. & Maschler, Michael, 1985. "Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 195-213, August.
  5. P. Young, 1999. "The Evolution of Conventions," Levine's Working Paper Archive 485, David K. Levine.
  6. D. Foster & P. Young, 2010. "Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 493, David K. Levine.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Hwang, Sung-Ha & Newton, Jonathan, 2014. "A classification of bargaining solutions by evolutionary origin," Working Papers 2014-02, University of Sydney, School of Economics.
  2. Rozen, Kareen, 2008. "Conflict Leads to Cooperation in Nash Bargaining," Working Papers 39, Yale University, Department of Economics.
  3. H Peyton Young & Heinrich H. Nax & Bary S.R. Pradelski, 2012. "Decentralized dynamics and equitable core selection in assignment games," Economics Series Working Papers 607, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  4. Agastya, Murali, 2004. "Stochastic stability in a double auction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 203-222, August.
  5. Arnold, Tone & Schwalbe, Ulrich, 2002. "Dynamic coalition formation and the core," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 363-380, November.
  6. Bary S.R. Pradelski, 2014. "Evolutionary Dynamics and Fast Convergence in the Assignment Game," Economics Series Working Papers 700, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  7. Heinrich H. Nax & Bary S. R. Pradelski & H. Peyton Young, 2013. "The Evolution of Core Stability in Decentralized Matching Markets," Working Papers 2013.50, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  8. Tone Dieckmann & Ulrich Schwalbe, 2000. "Dynamic Coalition Formation and the Core," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1878, Econometric Society.
  9. Kevin Hasker, 2014. "The Emergent Seed: A Representation Theorem for Models of Stochastic Evolution and two formulas for Waiting Time," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000954, David K. Levine.
  10. Péter Szikora, 2013. "Introduction into the literature of cooperative game theory with special emphasis on dynamic games and the core," Proceedings- 11th International Conference on Mangement, Enterprise and Benchmarking (MEB 2013), Óbuda University, Keleti Faculty of Business and Management.
  11. Bettina Klaus & Jonathan Newton, 2014. "Stochastic Stability in Assignment Problems," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 14.02, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
  12. Agastya, Murali, 2003. "Stochastic Stability In A Double Auction," Working Papers 5, University of Sydney, School of Economics.
  13. Szikora Péter, 2011. "Tanítás értelmezhetõ-e, mint egy kooperatív dinamikus játék?," Proceedings- 9th International Conference on Mangement, Enterprise and Benchmarking (MEB 2011), Óbuda University, Keleti Faculty of Business and Management.
  14. Péter Szikora, 2012. "Dynamic cooperative models of coalition formation and the core," Proceedings- 10th International Conference on Mangement, Enterprise and Benchmarking (MEB 2012), Óbuda University, Keleti Faculty of Business and Management.
  15. Newton, Jonathan, 2012. "Recontracting and stochastic stability in cooperative games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(1), pages 364-381.

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