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A Dynamic Model of Equilibrium Selection In Signaling Markets Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Gerorg Nöldeke
Larry Samuelson
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Paper provided by ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution in its series ELSE working papers with number
038.
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Handle: RePEc:els:esrcls:038Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.ucl.ac.uk/economics/ELSE/ More information through EDIRC
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Keywords: ract: In his work on signaling Spence proposed a dynamic model of a market in which a buyer revises prices in light of experience and in which sellers with private information about their types choose utility-maximizing signals given these prices. We follows Spence's suggestion of introducing perturbations into the resulting dynamic process. In a broad class of markets our model selects a separating equilibrium outcome if and only if the equilibrium outcome satisfies a version of the undefeated equilibrium concept whereas a pooling equilibrium outcome is selected if and only if the equilibrium outcome is both undefeated and satisfies D1. Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
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Matthew Rabin and Joel Sobel., 1993.
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Matthew Rabin & Joel Sobel, 1993.
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University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series
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Other versions: Burkhard Schipper, 2002.
"Imitators and Optimizers in Cournot Oligopoly ,"
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Other versions: Kjell Hausken, 2006.
"A General Equilibrium Model of Signaling and Exchange ,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
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Carlos Alós-Ferrer, 2001.
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