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A Dynamic Model of Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Markets

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Author Info
Noldeke, Georg
Samuelson, Larry

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 73 (1997)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 118-156
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:73:y:1997:i:1:p:118-156

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Cho, In-Koo & Sobel, Joel, 1990. "Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 381-413, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Bergin, James & Lipman, Barton L, 1996. "Evolution with State-Dependent Mutations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(4), pages 943-56, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Mailath George J. & Okuno-Fujiwara Masahiro & Postlewaite Andrew, 1993. "Belief-Based Refinements in Signalling Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 241-276, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. repec:att:wimass:19949 is not listed on IDEAS
  5. Young H. P., 1993. "An Evolutionary Model of Bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 145-168, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Hellwig, Martin, 1987. "Some recent developments in the theory of competition in markets with adverse selection ," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 31(1-2), pages 319-325. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Georg Noldeke & Larry Samuelson, 1994. "Learning to Signal in Markets," Game Theory and Information 9410001, EconWPA, revised 21 Oct 1994. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1993. "Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2147, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Arthur J Robson & Fernando Vega-Redondo, 1999. "Efficient Equilibrium Selection in Evolutionary Games with Random Matching," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2112, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 630-49, November.
  11. Noeldecke,Georg & Samuelson,Larry, . "An evolutionary analysis of backward and forward induction," Discussion Paper Serie B 228, University of Bonn, Germany.
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  12. Cho, In-Koo & Kreps, David M, 1987. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Riley, John G, 1979. "Informational Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 331-59, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  14. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Samuelson Larry, 1994. "Stochastic Stability in Games with Alternative Best Replies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 35-65, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Joseph Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, 1990. "Sorting Out the Differences Between Signaling and Screening Models," NBER Technical Working Papers 0093, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Spence, A Michael, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 87(3), pages 355-74, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Matthew Rabin and Joel Sobel., 1993. "Deviations, Dynamics and Equilibrium Refinements," Economics Working Papers 93-211, University of California at Berkeley.
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  1. Friedman, Daniel & Singh, Nirvikar, 2007. "Equilibrium Vengeance," MPRA Paper 4321, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Andriy Zapechelnyuk & Ro'i Zultan, 2008. "Job Market Signalling and Job Search," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000002301, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Philippe Raab, 2005. "Can Endogenous Group Formation Prevent Coordination Failure? A Theoretical and Experimental Investigation," IZA Discussion Papers 1628, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  4. Weibull, Jörgen W., 1997. "What have we learned from Evolutionary Game Theory so far?," Working Paper Series 487, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised 26 Oct 1998. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Burkhard Schipper, 2002. "Imitators and Optimizers in Cournot Oligopoly," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse29_2002, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Werner Güth & Hartmut Kliemt & Georg v. Wangenheim, 2006. "Verstehen, Verständigung, Vertrag - Ökonomik als Geistes-, Natur- und Staatswissenschaft," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2006-12, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
  7. Kris de Jaegher, 2007. "Efficient Communication in the Electronic Mail Game," Working Papers 07-11, Utrecht School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Kjell Hausken, 2006. "A General Equilibrium Model of Signaling and Exchange," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000001035, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
  9. Carlos Alós-Ferrer, 2001. "Cournot versus Walras in Dynamic Oligopolies with Memory," Vienna Economics Papers 0110, University of Vienna, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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