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Evolutionary Learning in Signalling Games

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  • Jacobsen, Hans Jorgen
  • Jensen, Mogens
  • Sloth, Birgitte

Abstract

We study equilibrium selection by evolutionary learning in monotone signalling games. The learning process is a development of that introduced by Young for static games extended to deal with incomplete information and sequential moves; it thus involves stochastic trembles. For vanishing trembles the process gives rise to strong selection among sequential moves equilibria. If the game has separating equilibria, then in the long run only play according to a specific separating equilibrium, the so-called Riley equilibrium, will be observed frequently. This selection, is stronger than, and only partly in accordance with, traditional selection based on restrictions on "out-of-equilibrium" beliefs.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 34 (2001)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 34-63

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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:34:y:2001:i:1:p:34-63

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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Cited by:
  1. Friedman, Daniel & Singh, Nirvikar, 2007. "Equilibrium Vengeance," MPRA Paper 4321, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Daniel Friedman & Nirvikar Singh, 2004. "Vengefulness Evolves in Small Groups," Game Theory and Information 0412005, EconWPA.
  3. Voorneveld, Mark & Weibull, Jörgen W., 2004. "Prices and quality signals," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 551, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 08 Mar 2004.
  4. Elliott O. Wagner, 2013. "The Dynamics of Costly Signaling," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 4(2), pages 163-181, April.

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