Evolutionary Learning in Signalling Games
AbstractWe study equilibrium selection by evolutionary learning in monotone signalling games. The learning process is a development of that introduced by Young for static games extended to deal with incomplete information and sequential moves; it thus involves stochastic trembles. For vanishing trembles the process gives rise to strong selection among sequential moves equilibria. If the game has separating equilibria, then in the long run only play according to a specific separating equilibrium, the so-called Riley equilibrium, will be observed frequently. This selection, is stronger than, and only partly in accordance with, traditional selection based on restrictions on "out-of-equilibrium" beliefs.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.
Volume (Year): 34 (2001)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836
Other versions of this item:
- Hans Jørgen Jacobsen & Mogens Jensen & Birgitte Sloth, 1999. "Evolutionary Learning in Signalling Games," Discussion Papers 99-01, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- Hans Jørgen Jacobsen & Mogens Jensen & Birgitte Sloth, 1998. "Evolutionary Learning in Signalling Games," CIE Discussion Papers 1999-14, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics, revised Sep 1999.
- Jacobsen, H.J. & Jensen, M. & Sloth, B., 1999. "Evolutionary Learning in Signalling Games," Papers 99-01, Carleton - School of Public Administration.
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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- Voorneveld, Mark & Weibull, Jörgen W., 2004. "Prices and quality signals," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 551, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 08 Mar 2004.
- Friedman, Daniel & Singh, Nirvikar, 2004.
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- Friedman, Daniel & Singh, Nirvikar, 2007.
4321, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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