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Evolutionary Dynamics and Fast Convergence in the Assignment Game

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  • Bary S.R. Pradelski
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    Abstract

    We study evoloutionary, decentralized dynamics for the classic assignment game (Shapley and Shubik 1972).� Players encounter each other at random and agree to match if they are feasible.� We propose a variant of the behaviorally motivated model in Nax, Pradelski, and Young (2013) which converges to stable and optimal outcomes in polynomial time in the number of players.� This is achieved although players have no knowledge about other players' payoffs or actions.� Instead, there is a market sentiment: if negative players on one side of the market (workers) are asking for a bit less, if positive players on the other side of the market (firms) are offering a bit more.� We also show that the latter condition is necessary.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number 700.

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    Date of creation: 03 Mar 2014
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    Handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:700

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    Keywords: assignment games; core; evolutionary game theory; matching markets; convergence time;

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