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The Biggest Auction Ever: the Sale of the British 3G Telecom Licenses Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Ken Binmore (Dept of Economics, University College London)
Paul Klemperer () (Nuffield College, Oxford University )
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registered author(s):
This paper reviews the part played by economists in organizing the British third-generation mobile-phone licence auction that concluded on 27 April 2000. It raised £22 1/2 billion ($34 billion or 2 1/2% of GNP) and was widely described at the time as the biggest auction ever. We discuss the merits of auctions versus "beauty contests", the aims of the auction, the problems we faced, the auction designs we considered, and the mistakes that were made.
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Paper provided by Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford in its series Economics Papers with number
2002-W4.
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Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: 01 Feb 2001Date of revision:
01 Sep 2001Handle: RePEc:nuf:econwp:0204Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/economics/
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Catherine McNeill).
Keywords: Auctions Telecommunications Spectrum Auctions Mobile Phones 3G UMTS Bidding. Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports :
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Klemperer, Paul, 2002.
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Peter Cramton & Jesse Schwartz, 2000.
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references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
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Klemperer, Paul, 2002.
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