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An experimental test of design alternatives for the British 3G/UMTS auction

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  • Abbink, Klaus
  • Irlenbusch, Bernd
  • Pezanis-Christou, Paul
  • Rockenbach, Bettina
  • Sadrieh, Abdolkarim
  • Selten, Reinhard

Abstract

In spring 2000, the British government auctioned off licences for Third Generation mobile telecommunications services. In the preparation of the auction, two designs involving each a hybrid of an English and a sealed-bid auction were suggested by the government: a discriminatory and a uniform price variant. We report an experiment on these two designs, and also compare the results to those with a pure English auction. Both hybrids are similar in efficiency, revenue differences disappear as bidders get experienced. Compared to the discriminatory format, the pure English auction gives new entrants better chances.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 49 (2005)
Issue (Month): 2 (February)
Pages: 505-530

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Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:49:y:2005:i:2:p:505-530

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eer

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References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Kirchkamp, Oliver & Reiss, J. Philipp & Sadrieh, Abdolkarim, 2008. "A pure variation of risk in private-value auctions," Research Memorandum 050, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  2. Ken Binmore & Paul Klemperer, 2001. "The Biggest Auction Ever: the Sale of the British 3G Telecom Licenses," Economics Papers 2002-W4, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford, revised 01 Sep 2001.
  3. Damme, E.E.C. van, 2002. "The European UMTS-auctions," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-89584, Tilburg University.
  4. Dejan Trifunović & Bojan Ristić, 2013. "Multi-Unit Auctions In The Procurement Of Electricity," Economic Annals, Faculty of Economics, University of Belgrade, vol. 58(197), pages 47-78, April –.
  5. van Damme, Eric, 2002. "The European UMTS-auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(4-5), pages 846-858, May.
  6. Schmidt, Klaus M., 2009. "The Role of Experiments for the Development of Economic Theories," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 252, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  7. Hans-Theo Normann & Roberto Ricciuti, 2009. "Laboratory Experiments For Economic Policy Making," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(3), pages 407-432, 07.
  8. Matthias Sutter & Martin Kocher & Sabine Strau?, . "Individuals and teams in UMTS-license auctions," Working Papers 2007-23, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck.
  9. Steven Tucker & Charles Noussair & Anthony M. Kwasnica & Katerina Sherstyuk, 2013. "Multiunit Auctions," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(3), pages 461-490, 07.
  10. Klaus Abbink & Jordi Brandts & Paul Pezanis-Christou, 2002. "Auctions for Government Securities: A Laboratory Comparison of Uniform, Discriminatory and Spanish Designs," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 551.02, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  11. Croson, Rachel & Gächter, Simon, 2010. "The science of experimental economics," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 122-131, January.
  12. Martin Bichler & Pasha Shabalin & Jürgen Wolf, 2013. "Do core-selecting Combinatorial Clock Auctions always lead to high efficiency? An experimental analysis of spectrum auction designs," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 16(4), pages 511-545, December.

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