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The German UMTS Design: Insights From Multi-Object Auction Theory

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Author Info
Moldovanu, Benny () (Department of Economics, University of Mannheim, Germany)
Ewerhart II, Christian () (Sonderforschungsbereich 504)

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Abstract

We briefly survey several insights about value and revenue maximization in multi-object auctions and apply them to the German (and Austrian) UMTS auction. In particular, we discuss in detail the exposure probelm that caused firms in Germany to pay almost Euro 20 billion for nothing.

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Paper provided by Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim in its series Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications with number 02-05.

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Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: 05 Dec 2001
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Handle: RePEc:xrs:sfbmaa:02-05

Note: C. Ewerhart thanks Mathias Meisel, portfolio manager at Zurich Invest, for many insightful discussions concerning the telecommunications industry. B. Moldovanu wishes to acknowledge the long cooperation with Philippe Jehiel. This cooperation has shaped several main ideas in this paper. We also wish to thank the participants at the CES/IFO conference on auctions and telecommunications for their many helpful comments.
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  2. Partha Dasgupta & Eric Maskin, 2000. "Efficient Auctions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 115(2), pages 341-388, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Veronika Grimm & Frank Riedel & Elmar Wolfstetter, 2001. "The Third Generation (UMTS) Spectrum Auction in Germany," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Klemperer, Paul, 2000. "What Really Matters in Auction Design," CEPR Discussion Papers 2581, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Paul R. Milgrom, 1985. "Auction Theory," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 779, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  6. Jehiel, Philippe & Benny Moldovanu, 1994. "Strategic Non-Participation," Discussion Paper Serie B 287, University of Bonn, Germany.
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  7. Cremer, Jacques & McLean, Richard P, 1988. "Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(6), pages 1247-57, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Noussair, Charles, 1995. "Equilibria in a Multi-object Uniform Price Sealed Bid Auction with Multi-unit Demands," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 5(2), pages 337-51, March.
  13. Moldovanu, Benny & Ewerhart II, Christian, 2002. "A Stylized Model of the German UMTS Auction," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 02-07, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim. [Downloadable!]
  14. Bernard Caillaud & Philippe Jehiel, 1998. "Collusion in Auctions with Externalities," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(4), pages 680-702, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 1995. "Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 98wpdr, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 22 Jul 2002. [Downloadable!]
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  19. Jehiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1999. "Multidimensional Mechanism Design for Auctions with Externalities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 85(2), pages 258-293, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  20. Gilbert, Richard J & Newbery, David M G, 1982. "Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of Monopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(3), pages 514-26, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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