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Subasta de telefonía móvil: ¿una experiencia inconclusa en Uruguay?

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  • Andrés Pereyra

    (Departmento de Economía, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Universidad de la República)

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    Abstract

    Uruguay is carring out an incipient regulatory reform process in telecommunication sector. The reform stresses on the liberalization of all services but fixed telephone and national long distance, and the creation of a regulatory agency. Privatization of the national utility is not foreseen. The liberalization of the mobile market requires the use of a scarce resource, the spectrum, that limits the number of possible entrants, thus it was decided to regulate the access through an auction. Licences auctions for mobile provoked a revolution in auction theory. Due to the special characteristics of the object to be auctioned, several designs were developed and applied in different countries. Finally, British auction in multiple rounds was adopted as a consensus design. This kind of desing is better than others used previously, but it is sensitive to some details that influence too much on the auctioneer results. In this paper we analyze the Uruguayan auction design compared to those used in other countries as well as its implementation details. The auction processus is having important problems related to political issues, the relationship with regional telecommunication markets and economic crisis, rather than the auction design itself. In this paper we discuss the relevance of all this elements in promoting competition in mobile market.

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    File URL: http://decon.edu.uy/publica/2002/Doc0302.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Department of Economics - dECON in its series Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) with number 0302.

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    Length: 46 pages
    Date of creation: Jul 2001
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:ude:wpaper:0302

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    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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    1. Cramton, Peter, 1998. "The Efficiency of the FCC Spectrum Auctions," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(2), pages 727-36, October.
    2. Cramton, Peter & Schwartz, Jesse A, 2000. "Collusive Bidding: Lessons from the FCC Spectrum Auctions," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 229-52, May.
    3. Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, 1999. "Prices and the Winner's Curse," Game Theory and Information 9904003, EconWPA.
    4. Paul Klemperer, 1999. "Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature," Microeconomics 9903002, EconWPA.
    5. Cramton, Peter, 1998. "Ascending auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 745-756, May.
    6. Paul Milgrom, . "Putting Auction Theory to Work: The Simultaneous Ascending Auction," Working Papers 98002, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
    7. Peter Cramton, 1997. "The FCC Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessment," Papers of Peter Cramton 97jemsfcc, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 12 Jul 1998.
    8. Peter Cramton & Jesse Schwartz, 2002. "Collusive Bidding in the FCC Spectrum Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 02collude, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 04 Dec 2002.
    9. Klemperer, Paul, 2000. "What Really Matters in Auction Design," CEPR Discussion Papers 2581, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. Lawrence Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 2004. "Vickrey auctions with reserve pricing," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 23(3), pages 493-505, March.
    11. R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, 1996. "Analyzing the Airwaves Auction," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(1), pages 159-175, Winter.
    12. John McMillan, 1994. "Selling Spectrum Rights," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 8(3), pages 145-162, Summer.
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