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Abstract

Uruguay is carring out an incipient regulatory reform process in telecommunication sector. The reform stresses on the liberalization of all services but fixed telephone and national long distance, and the creation of a regulatory agency. Privatization of the national utility is not foreseen. The liberalization of the mobile market requires the use of a scarce resource, the spectrum, that limits the number of possible entrants, thus it was decided to regulate the access through an auction. Licences auctions for mobile provoked a revolution in auction theory. Due to the special characteristics of the object to be auctioned, several designs were developed and applied in different countries. Finally, British auction in multiple rounds was adopted as a consensus design. This kind of desing is better than others used previously, but it is sensitive to some details that influence too much on the auctioneer results. In this paper we analyze the Uruguayan auction design compared to those used in other countries as well as its implementation details. The auction processus is having important problems related to political issues, the relationship with regional telecommunication markets and economic crisis, rather than the auction design itself. In this paper we discuss the relevance of all this elements in promoting competition in mobile market.

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File URL: http://decon.edu.uy/publica/2002/Doc0302.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Department of Economics - dECON in its series Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) with number 0302.

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Length: 46 pages
Date of creation: Jul 2001
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ude:wpaper:0302

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1. Peter Cramton & Jesse Schwartz, 2000. "Collusive Bidding: Lessons from the FCC Spectrum Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 00jre, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 09 Mar 1999.
   
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2. Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, 1999. "Prices and the Winner's Curse," Game Theory and Information 9904003, EconWPA.
   
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   • Milgrom, Paul, 1998. "Putting auction theory to work : the simultaneous ascending auction," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1986, The World Bank.
4. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 2004. "Vickrey Auctions with Reserve Pricing," Papers of Peter Cramton 99wpvic, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 28 Jun 1999.
   
   • Lawrence Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 2004. "Vickrey auctions with reserve pricing," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 23(3), pages 493-505, March.
5. R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, 1996. "Analyzing the Airwaves Auction," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(1), pages 159-175, Winter.
6. Paul Klemperer, 2002. "What Really Matters in Auction Design," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(1), pages 169-189, Winter.
   
   • Klemperer, Paul, 2000. "What Really Matters in Auction Design," CEPR Discussion Papers 2581, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
   • Professor Paul Klemperer, 2000. "What Really Matters in Auction Design," Microeconomics 0004008, EconWPA.
7. Paul Klemperer, 1999. "Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature," Microeconomics 9903002, EconWPA.
   
   • Klemperer, Paul, 1999. " Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(3), pages 227-86, July.
   • Klemperer, P., 1999. "Auction Theory: a Guide to the Literature," Economics Papers 1999-w12, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
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8. Peter Cramton, 1997. "The FCC Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessment," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(3), pages 431-495, 09.
   
   • Peter Cramton, 1997. "The FCC Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessment," Papers of Peter Cramton 97jemsfcc, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 12 Jul 1998.
9. Peter Cramton, 1998. "Ascending Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 98eer, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 28 Jul 1998.
   
   • Cramton, Peter, 1998. "Ascending auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 745-756, May.
10. Peter Cramton, 1998. "The Efficiency of the FCC Spectrum Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 98jlefcc, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 27 Jul 1998.
    
    • Cramton, Peter, 1998. "The Efficiency of the FCC Spectrum Auctions," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(2), pages 727-36, October.
11. Peter Cramton & Jesse Schwartz, 2002. "Collusive Bidding in the FCC Spectrum Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 02collude, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 04 Dec 2002.
    
    • Peter Cramton & Jesse A. Schwartz, 2002. "Collusive Bidding in the FCC Spectrum Auctions," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 0(1), pages 11.
    • Peter Cramton & Jesse Schwartz, 2000. "Collusive Bidding in the FCC Spectrum Auctions," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1210, Econometric Society.
12. John McMillan, 1994. "Selling Spectrum Rights," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 8(3), pages 145-162, Summer.
13. Paul Klemperer & Jeremy Bulow, 1998. "Prices and the Winners Curse," Economics Series Working Papers 1998-W02, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.

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