We develop a model in which firms set impersonal salary levels before matching with workers. Salaries fall relative to any competitive equilibrium while profits rise by almost as much, implying little inefficiency. Furthermore, the best firms gain the most from the system while wages become compressed. We discuss the performance of alternative institutions and the recent antitrust case against the National Residency Matching Program in light of our results.
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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number
11506.
Length: Date of creation: Aug 2005 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11506
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Heidrun C. Hoppe & Benny Moldovanu & Aner Sela, 2005.
"The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals,"
Discussion Papers
85, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
[Downloadable!]
John William Hatfield & Paul R. Milgrom, 2005.
"Matching with Contracts,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 913-935, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Jean-Charles Rochet Author-Email: rochet@cict.fr Author-Workplace-Name: IDEI, University of Toulouse & Jean Tirole Author-Email: tirole@cict.fr Author-Workplace-Name: IDEI, University of Toulouse, 2006.
"Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Report,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 37(3), pages 645-667, Autumn.
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