Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples
AbstractCouples looking for jobs in the same labor market may cause instabilities. We determine a natural preference domain, the domain of weakly responsive preferences, that guarantees stability. Under a restricted unemployment aversion condition we show that this domain is maximal for the existence of stable matchings. We illustrate how small deviations from (weak) responsiveness, that model the wish of couples to be closer together, cause instability, even when we use a weaker stability notion that excludes myopic blocking. Our remaining results deal with various properties of the set of stable matchings for "responsive couples markets," viz., optimality, filled positions, and manipulation.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Barcelona Graduate School of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 117.
Date of creation: Mar 2004
Date of revision:
Matching; couples; responsiveness; stability;
Other versions of this item:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
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