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Some Things Couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask)

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  • Bettina Klaus
  • Flip Klijn
  • Jordi Massó

Abstract

In this note we study the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) algorithm in the US market for physicians. We report on two problems that concern the presence of couples, a feature explicitly incorporated in the new NRMP algorithm (cf. Roth and Peranson, 1999). First, we show that the new NRMP algorithm may not find an existing stable matching, even when couples' preferences are "responsive," i.e., when Gale and Shapleys (1962) deferred acceptance algorithm (on which the old NRMP algorithm is based) is applicable. Second, we demonstrate that the new NRMP algorithm may also be manipulated by couples acting as singles.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Barcelona Graduate School of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 78.

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Date of creation: Sep 2003
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Handle: RePEc:bge:wpaper:78

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Keywords: Matching; stability; couples;

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References

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  1. Alvin E. Roth & Elliott Peranson, 1999. "The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design," NBER Working Papers 6963, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Roth, Alvin E, 1984. "The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(6), pages 991-1016, December.
  3. Alvin E. Roth, 2002. "The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 70(4), pages 1341-1378, July.
  4. Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn, 2004. "Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples," Working Papers 117, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  5. Zhou Lin, 1994. "A New Bargaining Set of an N-Person Game and Endogenous Coalition Formation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 512-526, May.
  6. Roth, Alvin E & Vande Vate, John H, 1990. "Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1475-80, November.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Peter Biro & Tamas Fleiner & Rob Irving, 2013. "Matching Couples with Scarf's Algorithm," IEHAS Discussion Papers, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences 1330, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
  2. Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn, 2004. "Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples," Working Papers 117, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  3. Klaus, Bettina & Klijn, Flip, 2007. "Paths to stability for matching markets with couples," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 154-171, January.
  4. Péter Biró & Flip Klijn, 2013. "Matching With Couples: A Multidisciplinary Survey," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 15(02), pages 1340008-1-1.
  5. Lars Ehlers & Jordi Massó, 2004. "Incomplete Information and Small Cores in Matching Markets," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) 637.04, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  6. David Cantala, 2011. "Agreement toward stability in matching markets," Review of Economic Design, Springer, Springer, vol. 15(4), pages 293-316, December.
  7. Dogan, Onur & Laffond, Gilbert & Lainé, Jean, 2011. "The Core of Shapley-Scarf markets with couples," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 60-67, January.
  8. Alfredo Salgado-Torres, 2012. "A simple decentralized matching mechanism in markets with couples," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 32(3), pages 2044-2055.
  9. Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn, 2004. "Fair and Efficient Student Placement with Couples," Working Papers 145, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.

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