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The Communication Requirements of of Social Choice Rules and Supporting Budget Sets

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Author Info
Ilya Segal () (Department of Economics, Stanford University)
Abstract

The paper examines the communication requirements of social choice rules when the (sincere) agents privately know their preferences. It shows that for a large class of choice rules, any communication verifying that an alternative is in the rule must reveal supporting budget sets for the agents such that the optimality of the proposed alternative to all agents within their respective budget set in itself verifies the alternative. We characterize the budget equilibria that are the minimally informative messages verifying a given choice rule. This characterization is used to identify the communication burden of choice rules, measured with the number of transmitted bits or real variables. Applications include efficiency in convex economies, exact or approximate surplus maximization in combinatorial auctions, the core in indivisible good economies, and stable many-to-one matchings.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science in its series Economics Working Papers with number 0039.

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Length: 54 pages
Date of creation: May 2004
Date of revision:
Publication status: Forthcoming in Journal of Economic Theory
Handle: RePEc:ads:wpaper:0039

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Related research
Keywords: social choice rules; budget equilibria; choice rules efficiency in convex economies;

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