Incentive compatibility and informational requirements
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 34 (1984)
Issue (Month): 1 (October)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869
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