Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

An Efficient Dynamic Mechanism

Contents:

Author Info

  • Susan Athey
  • Ilya Segal
Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    No abstract is available for this item.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://kuznets.fas.harvard.edu/~athey/EfficientDynamic.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Levine's Bibliography with number 122247000000001134.

    as in new window
    Length:
    Date of creation: 14 Mar 2007
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000001134

    Contact details of provider:
    Web page: http://www.dklevine.com/

    Related research

    Keywords:

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. Bester, Helmut & Strausz, Roland, 2001. "Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 69(4), pages 1077-98, July.
    2. David A. Miller, 2012. "Robust Collusion with Private Information," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 79(2), pages 778-811.
    3. Susan Athey & David Miller, 2006. "Efficiency in Repeated Trade with Hidden Valuations," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000256, UCLA Department of Economics.
    4. Jonathan Levin, 2000. "Relational Incentive Contracts," Working Papers, Stanford University, Department of Economics 01002, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
    5. Gershkov, Alex & Szentes, Balázs, 2009. "Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 36-68, January.
    6. Susan Athey & Kyle Bagwell, 2007. "Collusion with Persistent Cost Shocks," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000898, UCLA Department of Economics.
    7. Roger B. Myerson, 1984. "Multistage Games with Communication," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 590, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    8. Krishna, Vijay & Morgan, John, 2004. "Contracting for Information under Imperfect Commitment," Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley qt4010c6w9, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
    9. Wang, Cheng, 1995. "Dynamic Insurance with Private Information and Balanced Budgets," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(4), pages 577-95, October.
    10. Crémer, Jacques & Spiegel, Yossi & Zheng, Charles, 2003. "Optimal Selling Mechanisms wth Costly Information Acquisition," IDEI Working Papers, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse 205, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    11. Claudio Mezzetti, 2004. "Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 72(5), pages 1617-1626, 09.
    12. Rogerson, William P, 1992. "Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(4), pages 777-93, October.
    13. Battaglini, Marco, 2005. "Optimality and Renegotiation in Dynamic Contracting," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 5014, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    14. Kohlberg, Elon & Mertens, Jean-Francois, 1986. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1003-37, September.
    15. d'ASPREMONT, Claude & GERARD-VARET, Louis-André, . "Incentives and incomplete information," CORE Discussion Papers RP -354, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    16. Wang, Cheng, 1995. "Dynamic Insurance with Private Information and Balanced Budgets," Staff General Research Papers 5249, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    17. Reichelstein, Stefan, 1984. "Incentive compatibility and informational requirements," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 32-51, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as in new window

    Cited by:
    This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page.

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000001134. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (David K. Levine).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.